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COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
Abstract. Traditional nance is built on the rationality paradigm. This chapter
discusses simple models from an alternative approach in which nancial markets are
viewed as complex evolutionary systems. Agents are boundedly rational and base
their investment decisions upon market forecasting heuristics. Prices and beliefs
about future prices co-evolve over time with mutual feedback. Strategy choice is
driven by evolutionary selection, so that agents tend to adopt strategies that were
successful in the past. Calibration of \simple complexity models" with heteroge-
neous expectations to real nancial market data and laboratory experiments with
human subjects are also discussed.
Finance is witnessing important changes, according to some even a paradigmatic
shift, from the traditional, neoclassical mathematical modeling approach based on
a representative, fully rational agent and perfectly ecient markets (Muth (1961),
Lucas (1971), Fama (1970)) to a behavioral approach based on computational mod-
els where markets are viewed as complex evolving systems with many interacting,
\boundedly rational" agents using simple \rule of thumb" trading strategies (e.g.
Anderson et al. (1988), Brock (1993), Arthur (1995), Arthur et al. (1997a), Tesfat-
sion and Judd (2006)). Investor's psychology plays a key role in behavioral nance,
and dierent types of psychology based trading and behavioral modes have been
identied in the literature, such as positive feedback or momentum trading, trend
extrapolation, noise trading, overcondence, overreaction, optimistic or pessimistic
traders, upward or downward biased traders, correlated imperfect rational trades,
overshooting, contrarian strategies, etc.. Some key references dealing with vari-
ous aspects of investor psychology include e.g. Cutler et al. (1990), DeBondt and
Thaler (1985), DeLong et al. (1990a, 1990b), Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998),
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Gervais and Odean (2001) and Hong and Stein (1999, 2003), among others; see e.g.
Shleifer (2000), Hirshleifer (2001) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for extensive
surveys and many more references on behavioral nance.
An important problem of a behavioral approach is that it leaves \many de-
grees of freedom". There are many ways individual agents can deviate from full
rationality. Evolutionary selection based on relative performance is one plausible
way to discipline the \wilderness of bounded rationality". Milton Friedman (1953)
has argued that non-rational agents will not survive evolutionary competition and
will therefore be driven out of the market, thus providing support to a representa-
tive rational agent framework as a (long run) description of the economy. In the
same spirit, Alchian (1950) argued that biological evolution and natural selection
driven by realized prots may eliminate non-rational, non-optimizing rms and
lead to a market where rational, prot maximizing rms dominate. Blume and
Easley (1992, 2006) have shown however that the market selection hypothesis does
not always hold and that non-rational agents may survive in the market. Brock
(1993,1997), Arthur et al. (1997b), LeBaron et al. (1999) and Farmer (2002),
amongst others, introduced articial stock markets, described by agent based mod-
els with evolutionary selection among many dierent interacting trading strategies.
They showed that the market does not generally select for the rational, fundamen-
tal strategy, and that simple technical trading strategies may survive in articial
markets. Computationally oriented agent-based simulation models have been re-
viewed in LeBaron (2006); see also the special issue of the Journal of Mathematical
Economics (Hens and Schenk-Hopp e, 2005) and the survey chapter of Evstigneev,
Hens and Schenk-Hopp e (2009) in this Handbook for an overview of evolutionary
nance1.
Stimulated by work on articial markets, in the last decade quite a number
of \simple complexity models" have been introduced. Markets are viewed as evo-
lutionary adaptive systems with boundedly rational interacting agents, but the
models are simple enough to be at least partly analytically tractable. The study
of simple complexity models typically requires a well balanced mixture of analyt-
ical and computational tools. This literature is surveyed in Hommes (2006) and
Chiarella (2007); see also Lux (2009), who discusses in detail how well models with
interacting agents match important stylized facts such as fat tails in the returns
distribution and long memory. Without repeating an extensive survey, this chapter
focuses on a number of simple examples, in particular the adaptive belief systems
(ABS) of Brock and Hommes (1997,1998). These models serve as didactic examples
of nonlinear dynamic asset pricing models with evolutionary strategy switching and
they illustrate some of the key features present in the interacting agents literature.
The model also has been used to test the relevance of the theory of heterogeneous
expectations empirically as well as in laboratory experiments with human subjects.
Simple complexity models may also be used by practitioners or policy makers. To
1Some other recent references are Amir et al. (2005) and Evstigneev et al. (2002, 2008).COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 7
illustrate this point, we present an example how such a model can be used to
evaluate how likely it is that a stock market bubble will resume.
Two important features of the ABS are that agents are boundedly rational and
that they have heterogeneous expectations. An ABS is in fact a standard discounted
value asset pricing model derived from mean-variance maximization, extended to
the case of heterogeneous beliefs. Two classes of investors that are also be observed
in nancial practice, can be distinguished: fundamentalists and technical analysts.
Fundamentalists base their forecasts of future prices and returns upon economic fun-
damentals, such as dividends, interest rates, price-earning ratio's, etc. In contrast,
technical analysts are looking for patterns in past prices and base their forecasts
upon extrapolation of these patterns. Fractions of these two types of traders are
time varying and depend upon relative performance. Strategy choice is thus based
on evolutionary selection or reinforcement learning, with agents switching to more
successful (i.e. protable) rules. Asset price 
uctuations are characterized by irreg-
ular switching between a stable phase when fundamentalists dominate the market
and an unstable phase when trend followers dominate and asset prices deviate from
benchmark fundamentals. Price deviations from the rational expectations funda-
mental and excess volatility are triggered by news about economic fundamentals
but may be amplied by evolutionary selection of trend following strategies.
There is empirical evidence that experience based reinforcement learning plays
an important role in investment decisions in real markets. For example, Ippolito
(1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Rockinger (1996) and
Karceski (2002) show for mutual funds data that money 
ows into past good per-
formers, while 
owing out of past poor performers, and that performance persists
on a short term basis. Pension funds are less extreme in picking good performance
but are tougher on bad performers (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002). Benartzi and
Thaler (2007) have shown that heuristics and biases play a signicant role in re-
tirement savings decisions. For example, using data from Vanguard they show that
the equity allocation of new participants rose from 58% in 1992 to 74% in 2000,
following a strong rise in stock prices in the late 1990s, but dropped back to 54%
in 2002, following the strong fall in stock prices.
Laboratory experiments with human subjects have shown that individuals often
do not behave fully rational, but tend to use heuristics, possibly biased, in making
economic decisions under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). In a similar
vein, Smith et al. (1988) have shown the occurrence of bubbles and the ease with
which markets deviate from full rationality in asset pricing laboratory experiments.
These bubbles occur despite the fact that participants had sucient information
to compute the fundamental value of the asset. Laboratory experiments with hu-
man subjects provide an important tool to investigate which behavioral rules lay
a signicant role in deviations from the rational benchmark, and they can thus
help to discipline the class of behavioral modes. Duy (2007) gives a stimulating
recent overview concerning the role of laboratory experiments to explain macro
phenomena.8 COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
Heterogeneity in forecasting future asset prices is supported by evidence from
survey data. For example, Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) reports that at the beginning
of 2000, 50% of individual investors considered the stock market to be overvalued,
approximately 25% believed that it was fairly valued, about 15% were unsure and
less than 10% believed that it was undervalued. This is an indication of heteroge-
neous beliefs among individual investors about the prospect of the stock market.
Similarly, Shiller (2000) nds evidence that investors' sentiment varies over time.
Both institutional and individual investors become more optimistic in response to
signicant increases in the recent performance of the stock market.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 introduces the main features of
adaptive belief systems and Section 1.2 discusses a number of simple examples with
2, 3 and 4 dierent trader types. In Section 1.3 an analytical framework with many
dierent trader types is presented. Section 1.4 discusses the empirical relevance
of behavioral heterogeneity. The estimation of a simple model with fundamental-
ists and chartist on yearly S&P500 data shows how the worldwide stock market
bubble in the late 1990s, triggered by good news about fundamentals (a new, in-
ternet technology), may have been strongly amplied by trend following strategies.
Section 1.5 reviews some learning to forecast laboratory experiments with human
subjects, investigating which individual forecasting rules agents may use, how these
rules interact and which aggregate outcome they co-create. Section 1.6 concludes,
sketching some challenges for future research and potential applications for nan-
cial practitioners and policy makers. An appendix contains a short mathematical
overview of bifurcation theory, which plays a role in the transition to complicated
price 
uctuations in the simple complexity models discussed in this chapter.
1.1 AN ASSET PRICING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS
This section discusses the asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs as intro-
duced in Brock and Hommes (1998), using evolutionary selection of expectations as
in Brock and Hommes (1997a). This simple modeling framework has been inspired
by computational work at the Santa Fe Institute (SFI) and may be viewed as a
simple, partly analytically tractable, version of the more complicated SFI articial
stock market of Arthur et al. (1997b).
Agents can either invest in a risk free or in a risky asset. The risk free asset is
in perfect elastic supply and pays a xed rate of return r; the risky asset pays an
uncertain dividend. Let pt be the price per share (ex-dividend) of the risky asset
at time t, and let yt be the stochastic dividend process of the risky asset. Wealth
dynamics is given by
Wt+1 = RWt + (pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt)zt; (1.1.1)
where R = 1 + r is the gross rate of risk free return and zt denotes the number of
shares of the risky asset purchased at date t. Let Eht and Vht denote the `beliefs' orAN ASSET PRICING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS 9
forecasts of trader type h about conditional expectation and conditional variance.
Agents are assumed to be myopic mean-variance maximizers so that the demand





where a is the risk aversion parameter. The demand zht for risky assets by trader
type h is then
zht =
Eht[pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt]
aVht[pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt]
=
Eht[pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt]
a2 ; (1.1.3)
where the conditional variance Vht = 2 is assumed to be constant and equal for all
types.2 Let zs denote the supply of outside risky shares per investor, also assumed
to be constant, and let nht denote the fraction of type h at date t. Equilibrium of




Eht[pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt]
a2 = zs; (1.1.4)
where H is the number of dierent trader types. The forecasts Eht[pt+1 + yt+1]
of tomorrows prices and dividends are made before the equilibrium price pt has
been revealed by the market and therefore will depend upon a publically available
information set It 1 = fpt 1;pt 2;:::;yt 1;yt 2;:::g of past prices and dividends.




nhtEht[pt+1 + yt+1]   a2zs: (1.1.5)
The quantity a2zs may be interpreted as a risk premium for traders to hold risky
assets.
1.1.1 The fundamental benchmark with rational agents
When all agents are identical and expectations are homogeneous the equilibrium
pricing equation (1.1.5) reduces to
Rpt = Et[pt+1 + yt+1]   a2zs; (1.1.6)
where Et is the common conditional expectation in the beginning of period t. It is
well known that, assuming that a transversality condition limt!1(Et[pt+k])=Rk = 0
2Gaunersdorfer (2000) investigates the case with time varying beliefs about variances and
shows that the asset price dynamics are quite similar. Chiarella and He (2002,2003) investigate
the model with heterogeneous risk aversion coecients.10 COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
holds, the price of the risky asset is given by the discounted sum of expected future








t in (1.1.7) is called the fundamental rational expectations price, or the
fundamental price for short. It is completely determined by economic fundamentals,
which are here given by the stochastic dividend process yt. In this Section we will
focus on the case of an independently identically distributed (IID) dividend process
yt, but the estimation of the simple 2-type model discussed in Section 1.4 uses a
non-stationary dividend process3. For the special case of an IID dividend process




 y   a2zs
Rk =
 y   a2zs
r
: (1.1.8)
Recall that, in addition to the rational expectations fundamental solution (1.1.7),
so-called rational bubble solutions of the form pt = p
t + (1 + r)t(p0   p
0) also
satisfy the pricing equation (1.1.6). Along these bubble solutions, traders have
rational expectations (perfect foresight), but they are ruled out by the transversality
condition. In a perfectly rational world, traders realize that such bubbles cannot
last forever and therefore all traders believe that the value of a risky asset equals
its fundamental price forever. Changes in asset prices are then only driven by
unexpected changes in dividends and random `news' about economic fundamentals.
In a heterogeneous world the situation will however be quite dierent.
1.1.2 Heterogeneous beliefs
It will be convenient to work with the deviation from the fundamental price
xt = pt   p
t: (1.1.9)
We make the following assumptions about the beliefs of trader type h:
B1 Vht[pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt] = Vt[pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt] = 2, for all h;t.
B2 Eht[yt+1] = Et[yt+1] =  y, for all h;t.
B3 All beliefs Eht[pt+1] are of the form
Eht[pt+1] = Et[p
t+1]+Eht[xt+1] = p +fh(xt 1;:::;xt L); for all h;t:
(1.1.10)
3Brock and Hommes (1997b) also discuss a non-stationary example, where the dividend process
follows a geometric random walk.AN ASSET PRICING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS 11
According to B1 beliefs about conditional variance are equal and constant for all
types, as discussed above already. Assumption B2 states that all types have correct
expectations about future dividends yt+1 given by the conditional expectation,
which is  y in the case of IID dividends. According to B3, beliefs about future prices
consist of two parts: a common belief about the fundamental plus a heterogeneous
part fht
4. Each forecasting rule fh represents a model of the market (e.g. a technical
trading rule) according to which type h believes that prices will deviate from the
fundamental price.
An important and convenient consequence of the assumptions B1-B3 about
traders' beliefs is that the heterogeneous agent market equilibrium equation (1.1.5)
can be reformulated in deviations from the benchmark fundamental. In particular
substituting the price forecast (1.1.10) in the market equilibrium equation (1.1.5)
and using Rp
t = Et[p
t+1 + yt+1]   a2zs yields the equilibrium equation in devia-








with fht = fh(xt 1;:::;xt L). Note that the benchmark fundamental is nested
as a special case within this general setup, with all forecasting strategies fh  0.
Hence, the adaptive belief systems can be used in empirical and experimental testing
whether asset prices deviate signicantly from some benchmark fundamental.
1.1.3 Evolutionary dynamics
The evolutionary part of the model describes how beliefs are updated over time,
that is, how the fractions nht of trader types evolve over time. These fractions are
updated according to an evolutionary tness or performance measure. The tness
measures of all trading strategies are publically available, but subject to noise.
Fitness is derived from a random utility model and given by
~ Uht = Uht + "iht; (1.1.12)
where Uht is the deterministic part of the tness measure and "iht represents an
individual agent's IID error when perceiving the tness of strategy h = 1;:::H. In
order to obtain analytical expressions for the probabilities or fractions, the noise
term "iht is assumed to be drawn from a double exponential distribution. As the
number of agents goes to innity, the probability that an agent chooses strategy h
4The assumption that all types know the fundamental price is without loss of generality, because
any forecasting rule not using the fundamental price can be re-parameterized or reformulated for
mathematical convenience in deviations from an (unknown) fundamental price p.12 COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE






Note that the fractions nht add up to 1. A key feature of (1.1.13) is that the
higher the tness of trading strategy h, the more traders will select strategy h.
Hence, (1.1.13) represents a form of reinforcement learning: agents tend to switch
to strategies that have performed well in the (recent) past. The parameter  in
(1.1.13) is called the intensity of choice; it measures the sensitivity of the mass
of traders to selecting the optimal prediction strategy. The intensity of choice
 is inversely related to the variance of the noise terms "iht. The extreme case
 = 0 corresponds to noise of innite variance, so that dierences in tness cannot
be observed and all fractions (1.1.13) will be xed over time and equal to 1=H.
The other extreme case  = +1 corresponds to the case without noise, so that
the deterministic part of the tness can be observed perfectly and in each period,
all traders choose the optimal forecast. An increase in the intensity of choice 
represents an increase in the degree of rationality with respect to evolutionary
selection of trading strategies. The timing of the coupling between the market
equilibrium equation (1.1.5) or (1.1.11) and the evolutionary selection of strategies
(1.1.13) is important. The market equilibrium price pt in (1.1.5) depends upon the
fractions nht. The notation in (1.1.13) stresses the fact that these fractions nht
depend upon most recently observed past tnesses Uh;t 1, which in turn depend
upon past prices pt 1 and dividends yt 1 in periods t 1 and further in the past, as
will be seen below. After the equilibrium price pt has been revealed by the market,
it will be used in evolutionary updating of beliefs and determining the new fractions
nh;t+1. These new fractions will then determine a new equilibrium price pt+1, etc.
In an adaptive belief system, market equilibrium prices and fractions of dierent
trading strategies thus co-evolve over time.
A natural candidate for evolutionary tness is (a weighted average of) realized
5See Manski and McFadden (1981) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1993) for extensive
discussion of discrete choice models and their applications in economics.AN ASSET PRICING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS 13
prots, given by6
Uht = (pt + yt   Rpt 1)
Eh;t 1[pt + yt   Rpt 1]
a2 + wUh;t 1; (1.1.14)
where 0  w  1 is a memory parameter measuring how fast past realized tness
is discounted for strategy selection.
Fitness can be rewritten in terms of deviations from the fundamental as
Uht = (xt   Rxt 1 + a2zs + t)





where t  p
t + yt   Et 1[p
t + yt] is a martingale dierence sequence.
1.1.4 Forecasting rules
To complete the model we have to specify the class of forecasting rules. Brock and
Hommes (1998) have investigated evolutionary competition between simple linear
forecasting rules with only one lag, i.e.
fht = ghxt 1 + bh: (1.1.16)
It can be argued that, for a forecasting rule to have any impact in real markets, it
has to be simple, because it seems unlikely that enough traders will coordinate on
a complicated rule. The simple linear rule (1.1.16) includes a number of important
special cases. For example, when both the trend and the bias parameters gh =
bh = 0 the rule reduces to the fundamentalists forecast, i.e.
fht  0; (1.1.17)
predicting that the deviation x from the fundamental will be 0, or equivalently that
the price will be at its fundamental value. Other important cases covered by the
linear forecasting rule (1.1.16) are the pure trend followers
fht = ghxt 1; gh > 0; (1.1.18)
6 Note that this tness measure does not take into account the risk taken at the moment
of the investment decision. In fact, one could argue that the tness measure (1.1.14) does not
take into account the variance term in (1.1.2) capturing the investors' risk taken before obtaining
that prot. On the other hand, in real markets realized net prots or accumulated wealth may
be what investors care about most, and the non-risk adjusted tness measure (1.1.14) may thus
be of relevant in practice. See also DeLong et al. (1990) for a discussion of this point. Given
that investors are risk averse mean-variance maximizers maximizing their expected utility from
wealth (1.1.2), an alternative, natural candidate for tness are the risk adjusted prots given by
ht = Rtzh;t 1   a
22z2
h;t 1, where Rt = pt + yt   Rpt 1 and zh;t 1 = Eh;t 1[Rt]=(a2) is the
demand by trader type h. Hommes (2001) shows that the risk adjusted tness measure is, up to
a type independent level, equivalent to minus squared prediction errors.14 COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
and the pure biased belief
fht = bh: (1.1.19)
Notice that the simple pure bias forecast (1.1.19) represents any positively or neg-
atively biased forecast of next periods price that traders might have. Instead of
these extremely simple habitual rule of thumb forecasting rules, some might prefer
the rational, perfect foresight forecasting rule
fht = xt+1: (1.1.20)
We emphasize however, that the perfect foresight forecasting rule (1.1.20) assumes
perfect knowledge of the heterogeneous market equilibrium equation (1.1.5), and
in particular perfect knowledge about the beliefs of all other traders. Although
the case with perfect foresight has much theoretical appeal, its practical relevance
in a complex heterogeneous world should not be overstated since this underlying
assumption seems rather strong7.
1.2 SIMPLE EXAMPLES
This section presents simple but typical examples of adaptive belief systems (ABS),
with two, three resp. four competing linear forecasting rules (1.1.16), where the
parameter gh represents a perceived trend in prices and the parameter bh represents
a perceived upward or downward bias. The ABS with H types is given by (in
deviations from the fundamental benchmark):
(1 + r)xt =
H X
h=1





Uh;t 1 = (xt 1   Rxt 2)(
ghxt 3 + bh   Rxt 2
a2 ) + wUh;t 2   Ch; (1.2.3)
where t is a small noise term representing, for example, a small fraction of noise
traders and/or random outside supply of the risky asset. In order to keep the
analysis of the dynamical behavior tractable, Brock and Hommes (1998) focused
on the case where the memory parameter w = 0, so that evolutionary tness is
given by last period's realized prot. A common feature of all examples is that,
as the intensity of choice to switch prediction or trading strategies increases, the
7Brock and Hommes (1997) analyze the cobweb model with costly rational versus cheap naive
expectations, and nd irregular price 
uctuations due to endogenous switching between free riding
and costly rational forecasting. In general however, a temporary equilibrium model with heteroge-
neous beliefs such as the asset pricing model, is dicult to analyze if one of the types has perfect
foresight. In a recent paper, Brock et al. (2008) discuss how a perfect foresight trader may aect
the dynamics in an asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs.SIMPLE EXAMPLES 15
fundamental steady state becomes locally unstable and non-fundamental steady
states, cycles or even chaos arise. In the examples below, we will encounter dierent
bifurcation routes (i.e. transitions) to complicated dynamics. A mathematical
appendix summarizes the most important bifurcations, that is, qualitative changes
in the dynamics (e.g. when a steady state loses stability or a new cycle is created)
when a model parameter changes.
1.2.1 Costly fundamentalists versus trend followers
The simplest example of an ABS only has two trader types, with forecasting rules
f1t = 0 fundamentalists (1.2.4)
f2t = gxt 1; g > 0; trend followers. (1.2.5)
The rst type are fundamentalists predicting that the price will equal its funda-
mental value (or equivalently that the deviation will be zero) and the second type
are pure trend followers predicting that prices will rise (or fall) by a constant rate.
In this example, the fundamentalists have to pay a xed per period positive cost C1
for information gathering; in all other examples discussed below information costs
will be set to zero for all trader types.
For small values of the trend parameter, 0  g < 1+r, the fundamental steady
state is always stable. Only for suciently high trend parameters, g > 1+r, trend
followers can destabilize the system. For trend parameters, 1+r < g < (1+r)2 the
dynamic behavior of the evolutionary system depends upon the intensity of choice to
switch between the two trading strategies8. For low values of the intensity of choice,
the fundamental steady state will be stable. As the intensity of choice increases,
the fundamental steady state becomes unstable due to a pitchfork bifurcation in
which two additional non-fundamental steady states  x < 0 < x are created.
As the intensity of choice increases further, the two non-fundamental steady states
also become unstable due to a Hopf-bifurcation, and limit cycles or even strange
attractors can arise around each of the (unstable) non-fundamental steady states9.
The evolutionary ABS may cycle around the positive non-fundamental steady state,
cycle around the negative non-fundamental steady state or, driven by the noise,
switch back and forth between cycles around the high and the low steady state, as
illustrated in Figure 1.1.
This example shows that, in the presence of information costs and with zero mem-
ory, when the intensity of choice in evolutionary switching is high fundamentalists
8For g > (1 + r)2 the system may become globally unstable and prices may diverge to innity.
Imposing a stabilizing force, for example by assuming that trend followers condition their rule
upon deviations from the fundamental e.g. as in Gaunersdorfer, Hommes and Wagener (2008),
leads to a bounded system again, possibly with cycles or even chaotic 
uctuations.
9See the appendix for a more detailed discussion of the pitchfork bifurcation and the Hopf
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Figure 1.1. Time series of price deviations from fundamental (top left) and fractions of fun-
damentalists (top right) and attractor (bottom) in the (xt;n1t)-phase space, for 2-type model
with costly fundamentalist versus trend followers bueted with small noise (SD=0.1). The
price dynamics is characterized by temporary bubbles when trend followers dominate the mar-
ket, interrupted by sudden crashes when fundamentalists dominate. In the presence of (small)
noise, the system switches back and forth between two co-existing quasi-periodic attractors
of the underlying deterministic skeleton, one with prices above and one with prices below its
fundamental value. Parameters are:  = 3:6, g = 1:2, R = 1:1 and C = 1.
can not drive out pure trend followers and persistent deviations from the funda-
mental price may occur.10
Figure 1.2 illustrates that the asset pricing model with costly fundamentalists versus
cheap trend following exhibits a rational route to randomness, that is, a bifurcation
route to chaos occurs as the intensity of choice to switch strategies increases.
10Brock and Hommes (1999) show that this result also holds when the memory in the tness
measure increases. In fact, an increase in the memory of the evolutionary tness leads to bifurca-
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Figure 1.2. Bifurcation diagram (left) and largest Lyapunov exponent plot (right) as a function
of the intensity of choice  for 2-type model with costly fundamentalist versus trend followers.
In both plots the model is bueted with very small noise (SD = 10
 6 for the noise term
t in (1.2.1)), to avoid that for large -values the system gets stuck in the locally unstable
steady state. Parameters are: g = 1:2, R = 1:1, C = 1 and 2    4. A pitchfork
bifurcation of the fundamental steady state, in which two stable non-fundamental steady
states are created, occurs for   2:37. The non-fundamental steady states become unstable
due to a Hopf-bifurcation for   3:33, and (quasi-)periodic dynamics arises. For large values
of  the largest Lyapunov exponent becomes positive indicating chaotic price dynamics.
1.2.2 Fundamentalists versus opposite biases
The second example of an ABS is an example with three trader types without any
information costs. The forecasting rules are
f1t = 0 fundamentalists (1.2.6)
f2t = b b > 0; positive bias (optimists) (1.2.7)
f3t =  b   b < 0; negative bias (pessimists): (1.2.8)
The rst type are fundamentalists as before, but there are no information costs for
fundamentalists. The second and third types have a purely biased belief, expecting
a constant price above respectively below the fundamental price.
For low values of the intensity of choice, the fundamental steady state is stable.
As the intensity of choice increases the fundamental steady becomes unstable due
to a Hopf bifurcation and the dynamics of the ABS is characterized by cycles
around the unstable steady state. This example shows that, even when there are
no information costs for fundamentalists, they cannot drive out other trader types
with opposite biased beliefs. In the evolutionary ABS with high intensity of choice,
fundamentalists and biased traders co-exist with fractions varying over time and
prices 
uctuating around the unstable fundamental steady state. Moreover, Brock
and Hommes (1998, p.1259, lemma 9) show that as the intensity of choice tends18 COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
to innity the ABS converges to a (globally) stable cycle of period 4. Average
prots along this 4-cycle are equal for all three trader types. Hence, if the initial
wealth is equal for all three types, then in this evolutionary system in the long run
accumulated wealth will be equal for all three types. This example shows that the
Friedman argument that smart-fundamental traders will always drive out simple
rule of thumb speculative traders is in general not valid11.
1.2.3 Fundamentalists versus trend and bias
The third example of an ABS is an example with four trader types, with linear
forecasting rules (1.1.16) with parameters g1 = 0, b1 = 0; g2 = 0:9, b2 = 0:2;
g3 = 0:9, b3 =  0:2 and g4 = 1+r = 1:01, b4 = 0. The rst type are fundamentalists
again, without information costs, and the other three types follow a simple linear
forecasting rule with one lag. The dynamical behaviour is illustrated in Figures 1.3
and 1.4.































Figure 1.3. Chaotic (top left) and noisy chaotic (top right) time series of asset prices in
adaptive belief system with four trader types. Strange attractor (bottom left) and enlargement
of strange attractor (bottom right). Belief parameters are: g1 = 0, b1 = 0; g2 = 0:9, b2 = 0:2;
g3 = 0:9, b3 =  0:2 and g4 = 1+r = 1:01, b4 = 0; other parameters are r = 0:01,  = 90:5,
w = 0 and Ch = 0 for all 1  h  4.
For low values of the intensity of choice, the fundamental steady state is sta-
ble. As the intensity of choice increases, as in the previous three type example,
11This result is related to DeLong et al. (1990ab) who show that a constant fraction of noise
traders can survive in the market in the presence of fully rational traders. The ABS however are
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Figure 1.4. Bifurcation diagram and largest Lyapunov exponent plot for 4-type model, buf-
feted with very small noise (SD = 10
 6 for noise term t in (1.2.1)), to avoid that for large
-values the system gets stuck in the locally unstable steady state. Belief parameters are:
g1 = 0, b1 = 0; g2 = 0:9, b2 = 0:2; g3 = 0:9, b3 =  0:2 and g4 = 1+r = 1:01, b4 = 0; other
parameters are r = 0:01,  = 90:5, w = 0 and Ch = 0 for all 1  h  4. The 4-type model
with fundamentalists versus trend followers and biased beliefs exhibits a Hopf bifurcation for
 = 50. A rational route to randomness, i.e. a bifurcation route to chaos, occurs, with positive
largest Lyapunov exponents, when the intensity of choice becomes large.
the fundamental steady becomes unstable due to a Hopf bifurcation and a stable
invariant circle around the unstable fundamental steady state arises, with peri-
odic or quasi-periodic 
uctuations. As the intensity of choice further increases, the
invariant circle breaks into a strange attractor with chaotic 
uctuations. In the
evolutionary ABS fundamentalists and chartists co-exist with time varying frac-
tions and prices moving chaotically around the unstable fundamental steady state.
Figure 1.4 shows that in this 4-type example with fundamentalists versus trend
followers and biased beliefs a rational route to randomness occurs, with positive
largest Lyapunov exponents for large values of .
This 4-type example shows that, even when there are no information costs for
fundamentalists, they cannot drive out other simple trader types and fail to stabilize
price 
uctuations towards its fundamental value. As in the three type case, the
opposite biases create cyclic behavior and, while trend extrapolation turns these
cycles into unpredictable chaotic 
uctuations.
1.2.4 Eciency
What can be said about market eciency in an adaptive belief system (ABS)?
The (noisy) chaotic price 
uctuations are characterized by an irregular switching
between phases of close-to-the-fundamental-price 
uctuations, phases of `optimism'
with prices following an upward trend, and phases of `pessimism', with (small) sud-
den market crashes, as illustrated in Figure 1.3. In fact, in the ABS prices are20 COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
characterized by evolutionary switching between the fundamental value and tem-
porary speculative bubbles. Hence, prices deviate persistently from fundamental
value and therefore, prices are excessively volatile and do not re
ect economic fun-
damentals. In this sense the market is inecient. But are these deviations easy to
predict? Even in the simple, stylized 4-type example in the purely deterministic
chaotic case, the timing and the direction of the temporary bubbles seem hard to
predict, but once a bubble has started, the collapse of the bubble seems to be pre-
dictable. In the presence of (small) noise however the situation is quite dierent,
as illustrated in Figure 1.3 (top right): the timing, the direction and the collapse
of the bubble all seem hard to predict.
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Figure 1.5. Forecasting errors for nearest neighbor method applied to chaotic and noisy chaotic
returns series, for dierent noise levels, in the 4-type adaptive belief system. All returns series
have close to zero autocorrelations at all lags. The benchmark case of prediction by the mean
0 is represented by the horizontal line at the normalized prediction error 1. Nearest neighbor
forecasting applied to the purely deterministic chaotic series leads to much smaller forecasting
errors at all prediction horizons 1-20 (lowest graph). A noise level of say 10% means that the
ratio of the variance of the noise t and the variance of the deterministic price series is 1=10.
As the noise level increases, the graphs shift upwards indicating that prediction errors increase.
Small dynamic noise thus quickly deteriorates forecasting performance.
To stress this point further, we investigate this (un)predictability, by employing
a so called nearest neighbor forecasting method to predict the returns, at lags 1 to 20
for the purely chaotic as well as for several noisy chaotic time series, as illustrated
in Figure 1.512. Nearest neighbor forecasting looks for patterns in the past that are
close to the most recent pattern, and then predicts the average value following all
nearby past patterns. According to Takens' embedding theorem this method yields
good forecasts for deterministic chaotic systems13. Figure 1.5 shows that as the
12I would like to thank Sebastiano Manzan for providing this gure.
13See Kantz and Schreiber (1997) for an extensive treatment of nonlinear time series analysis
and forecasting techniques.SIMPLE EXAMPLES 21
noise level increases, the forecasting performance of the nearest neighbor method
quickly deteriorates. Hence, in our simple nonlinear evolutionary ABS with noise
it is hard to make good forecasts of future returns and to predict when prices will
return to fundamental value. Our simple nonlinear ABS with small noise thus
captures some of the intrinsic unpredictability of asset returns also present in real
markets and in terms of predictability the market is close to being ecient.
1.2.5 Wealth accumulation
The evolutionary dynamics in an adaptive belief system (ABS) is driven by realized
short run prots, and chartists strategies survive in a world driven by short run
prot opportunities. In this subsection, we brie
y look at the accumulated wealth
in an ABS. Recall that accumulated wealth for strategy type h is given by
Wh;t+1 = RWht + (pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt)zht: (1.2.9)
The rst term represents wealth growth due to the risk free asset, while the last
term represents wealth growth (or decay) due to investments in the risky asset.
Because of market clearing, the average net in
ow of wealth due to investment in
the risky asset is given by
X
h
nhtzht(pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt) = zs(pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt): (1.2.10)
This is the average risk premium required by the population of investors to hold
the risky asset. In the special case zs = 0 the risk premium is 0 and on average
wealth of each strategy grows at the risk free rate.
Figure 1.6 shows the development of prices and wealth of each strategy in the
3-type and 4-type examples of subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3. Prices 
uctuate around
the fundamental price. For the 3-type example, the wealth accumulated by each
of the three strategies, fundamentalists, optimistic biased and pessimistic biased
grows over time, at an equal rate. Recall that in the 3 type example, for an innite
intensity of choice , the system converges to a stable 4-cycle with average prots
equal for all three strategies. At each time t, prots of fundamentalists are always
between prots of optimists and pessimists, but on average all prots are (almost)
equal, and thus accumulated wealth grows at the same rate.14
In the 4-type example, trend following strategies are protable during temporary
bubbles. Fundamentalists suer losses during temporary bubbles, but these losses
are limited. When the bubble bursts, fundamentalists make large prots while trend
followers suer from huge losses. On average accumulated wealth of fundamentalists
increases, while wealth of chartists decreases, as illustrated in Figure 1.6.
14For nite intensity of choice, e.g.  = 3000 as in Figure 1.6, wealth of the 3-types grows at
almost the same rate. For initial states chosen as in Figure 1.6, wealth of the optimistic types
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Figure 1.6. Time series of prices (left) and accumulated wealth in 3-type ABS (top panel),
4-type ABS (middle panel) and 5-type ABS (bottom panel). Belief parameters are b = 0:2
for the 3-type ABS (see subsection 1.2.2) and as in Figure 1.3 in the 4-type case. Other
parameters are:  = 3000 and  = 0:025 (3-type ABS); g4 = (1 + r)
2 = 1:0201,  = 180,
 y = 0:1, R = 1:01,  = 0:2 (4-type ABS), and  = 0:1 and threshold parameter # = 0:5
for switching strategy (5-type ABS).SIMPLE EXAMPLES 23
The wealth in (1.2.9) corresponds to the accumulated wealth of a trader who
always uses strategy h. How would a switching strategy perform in a heteroge-
neous market? Figure 1.6 (bottom panel) illustrates an example of an ABS with 5
strategies, where a switching strategy has been added to the 4-type ABS. The 5th
switching strategy is endogenous in the 5-type ABS, and thus aects the realized
market price in the same way as the other 4 strategies. The switching strategy
always picks the best of the other 4 strategies, according to last period's realized
prots, conditional on how far the price deviates from the fundamental benchmark.
In the simulation, when the price deviation becomes larger than a threshold param-
eter (# = 0:5), the switching strategy switches back to the fundamental strategy to
avoid losses when the bubble collapses. Figure 1.6 (bottom panel) illustrates two
features of the 5-type ABS. Firstly, due to the presence of the switching strategy,
the amplitude of price 
uctuations (bottom panel, left plot) is somewhat smaller
than in the 4-type ABS. This is caused by the switching strategy switching back to
the fundamental strategy when the price deviation exceeds the threshold. Secondly,
the accumulated wealth of the switching strategy outperforms all other strategies,
including the fundamental strategy (Figure 1.6 (bottom panel, right plot). Notice
that the two best strategies, the switching strategy and the fundamental strategy,
also require most information. The trend following strategies only use publically
available information on past prices.15 The fundamental strategy uses fundamental
information, while the switching strategy uses fundamental information as well as
information about competing strategies in the market and their performance.
In the ABS evolutionary framework agents switch strategies based on short
run realized prots. In the long run, a fundamental strategy often accumulates
more wealth than trend following rules. However, fundamental strategies suer
from losses during temporary bubbles when prices persistently deviate from funda-
mentals, and may therefore suer from \limits of arbitrage" (Shleifer and Vishny
(1997)). Fundamentalists can stabilize price 
uctuations, but only if they are not
limited by borrowing constraints or limits of arbitrage. In the long run, a simple
switching strategy may accumulate more wealth than a fundamental or technical
trading strategy. The fact that a simple switching strategy performs better in a
heterogeneous market shows that the ABS-model is behaviorally consistent. Agents
have an incentive to keep switching strategies. The switching strategy is very risky
however, because it requires good knowledge of the underlying fundamental and
good market timing to \get o the bubble before it bursts". Interestingly, Zwart
et al. (2007) provided empirical evidence, analyzing 15 emerging market currencies
over the period 1995-2006, that a combined strategy with time varying weights
may generate economically and statistically signicant returns, after accounting for
transaction costs. Their strategy is based on a combination of fundamental infor-
mation on the deviation from purchasing power parity and the real interest rate
15Recall that these strategies can be formulated without knowledge of the fundamental price,
see footnote 4.24 COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
dierential and chartist information from moving average trading rules, with time
varying weights determined by relative performance over the past year.
1.2.6 Extensions
Several modications and extensions of a adaptive belief systems (ABS) have been
studied. In Brock and Hommes (1998) the demand for the risky asset is derived
from a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function. Chiarella and He
(2001) consider the case with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility. This
is complicated, because under CARA utility investors' relative wealth aects asset
demand and realized asset price, and one has to keep track of the wealth distribu-
tion among the population of agents16. Anufriev and Bottazzi (2006) and Anufriev
(2008) study wealth and asset price dynamics in a heterogeneous agents frame-
work and are able to characterize the type of equilibria and their stability under
fairly general behavioral assumptions. Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini (2002,2006) use
CRRA utility in an ABS with a market maker price setting rule. Chiarella and He
(2003) and Hommes et al. (2005) investigate an ABS with a market maker price
setting rule, and nd quite similar dynamical behavior as in the case of a Walrasian
market clearing price. De Fontnouvelle (2000) and Goldbaum (2005) apply strategy
switching to an asset pricing model with heterogeneous information. Chang (2007)
studies how social interactions aect the dynamics of asset prices in an ABS with
a Walrasian market clearing price. DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2005,2006) applied
the ABS framework to exchange rate modeling. Chiarella (2009, this handbook)
discusses some of these extensions in more detail17.
1.3 MANY TRADER TYPES
In most heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) in the literature, the number of trader
types is small: usally only two, three or four types are considered that use simple
fundamentalist or chartist strategies. Generally, analytical tractability can only be
obtained at the cost of restricting a HAM to just a few types. Brock, Hommes and
Wagener (2005) have however developed a theoretical framework to study evolu-
tionary markets with many dierent trader types. In this subsection, we discuss
their notion of Large Type Limit (LTL), a simple, low dimensional approximation
of an evolutionary adaptive belief system (ABS) with many trader types. The LTL
can be developed in a fairly general market clearing setting, but here we focus on
its application to the asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs.
16In the artical market of Levy et al. (1994), asset demand is also derived from CRRA utility.
17Another related stochastic model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous strategy switch-
ing similar to the ABS has been introduced in F ollmer et al. (2005). Scheinkman and Xiong (2004)
review related stochastic nancial models with heterogeneous beliefs and short sale constraints.
Macro models with heterogeneous expectations have been studied, for instance, in Branch and
Evans (2006) and Branch and McGough (2008).MANY TRADER TYPES 25
Recall from (1.1.11) that in the asset market with H dierent trader types, the
















It is assumed that prediction and tness functions take the form fht = f(x;;#h)
and Uht = U(x;;#h) respectively, where x = (xt 1;xt 2;) is a vector of lagged
deviations from the fundamental,  is a structural parameter vector (e.g. containing
the risk free interest rate r, the risk aversion parameter a, the intensity of choice
, etc.) and #h is a multidimensional variable that characterizes the belief type h.
The equilibrium equation (1.3.2) determines the evolution of the system with H







h=1 eU(x;;#h) ; (1.3.3)
where # = (#1; ;#H). At the beginning of the market, a large number H of be-
liefs #h is sampled from a general distribution of beliefs. For example, all forecasting
rules may be drawn from a linear class of rules with L lags,
ft(#0) = #00 + #01xt 1 + #02xt 2 +  + #0Lxt L; (1.3.4)
with #0h, h = 0; ;L, drawn from a multivariate normal distribution.
The evolution map 'H in (1.3.3) determines the dynamical system correspond-
ing to an asset market with H dierent belief types. When the number of trader
types H is large, this dynamical system contains a large number of stochastic vari-
ables # = (#1;:::;#H), where the #h are IID, with distribution function F. At the
beginning of the market H belief types are drawn from this distribution, who then
compete against each other. The distribution function of the stochastic belief vari-
able #h depends on a multi-dimensional parameter , called the belief parameter.
This setup allows to vary the population out of which the individual beliefs are
sampled at the beginning of the market.
Observe that both the denominator and the numerator of the evolution map 'H
in (1.3.3) may be divided by the number of trader types H and thus may be seen as
sample means. The evolution map   of the large type limit (LTL) is then obtained
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where #0 is a stochastic variable, distributed in the same way as the #h, with
density . The structural parameter vector  of the evolution map 'H and of the
LTL evolution map   coincide. However, whereas the evolution map 'H in (1.3.3)
of the heterogeneous agent system contains H randomly drawn multi-dimensional
stochastic variables #h, the LTL evolution map   in (1.3.5) only contains the belief
parameter vector  describing the joint probability distribution. Taking a large
type limit thus leads to a huge reduction in stochastic belief variables.
According to the LTL-theorem of Brock et al. (2005), as the number H of trader
types tends to innity, the H-type evolution map ' converges almost surely to the
LTL-map  . This implies that the corresponding LTL dynamical system is a good
approximation of the dynamical behavior in a heterogeneous asset market when the
number of belief types H is large. In particular, all generic and persistent dynamic
properties will be preserved with high probability. For example, if the LTL-map
exhibits a bifurcation route to chaos for one of the structural parameters, then,
if the number of trader types H is large, the H-type system also exhibits such a
bifurcation route to chaos with high probability.
A straightforward computation using moment generating functions shows that,
for example, in the case of linear forecasting rules (1.3.4) with three lags (L = 3),
the corresponding LTL becomes a 5-D nonlinear system given by
(1 + r)xt = 0 + 1xt 1 + 2xt 2 + 3xt 3 (1.3.6)





where  = =(a2). The simplest special case of (1.3.6) that still leads to interesting
dynamics is obtained when all #0k = 0, 1  k  d, that is, when the forecasting
function (1.3.4) is purely biased: ft(#0) = #00. The LTL then simplies to the
linear system
Rxt = 0 + 2
0
 
xt 1   Rxt 2 + a2zs
: (1.3.7)
This simplest case already provides insight into the (in)stability of the (fundamen-
tal) steady state in an evolutionary system with many trader types. When there is
no intrinsic mean bias, that is when the mean of the biases #00 equals 0 (i.e. 0 = 0),
and the risk premium is zero (zs = 0), the steady state of the LTL (1.3.7) coincides
with the fundamental: x = 0. When the mean bias and risk premium are both
positive (negative) the steady state deviation x will be positive (negative) so that
the steady state will be above (below) the fundamental. The natural bifurcation
parameter tuning the (in)stability of the system is 2
0 = 2
0=a2. We see that
instability occurs if and only if  increases beyond the bifurcation point c = 1=2
0.
Hence this simple case already suggests forces that may destabilize the evolution-
ary system: an increase in choice intensity  for evolutionary selection, a decrease
in risk aversion a, a decrease in conditional variance of excess returns 2, or an
increase in the diversity of purely biased beliefs 2
0. All of these forces can push 
beyond c, thereby triggering instability of the (fundamental) steady state.MANY TRADER TYPES 27
For the large type limit (LTL) in (1.3.6), in the case of linear forecasting rules
with 3 lags, a bifurcation route to chaos, with asset prices 
uctuating around the
unstable fundamental steady state, occurs when  increases. This shows that a
rational route to randomness can occur in an asset market with many dierent
trader types, when traders become increasingly sensitive to dierences in tness
(i.e. an increase in the intensity of choice ) or traders become less risk averse (i.e.
a decrease of the coecient of risk aversion a). In a many trader types evolutionary
world fundamentalists will in general not drive out all other types and asset prices
need not converge to their fundamental value.












Figure 1.7. Bifurcation diagram in the (;1) parameter plane for the large type limit
(LTL) (1.3.6), where 1 represents the mean of the rst order stochastic trend variable
#01 in the forecasting rule (1.3.4). For 0 = a
2 = 0, with 0 the mean of the constant
#00 in the forecasting rule (1.3.4), the LTL is symmetric and thus non-generic (dotted
curves); when 0 6= 0 the LTL is non-symmetric and generic. The diagrams show Hopf
(H), period doubling (PD), pitchfork (PF) and saddle-node (SN) bifurcation curves in
(;1) parameter plane, with other parameters xed at R = 1:01, z
s = 0, 2 = 3 = 0,
0 = 1 = 2 = 1 and 3 = 0. Between the Hopf and PD curves (and the PF curve when
0 = 0) there is a unique, stable steady state. This steady state becomes unstable when
crossing the Hopf or the PD curve. Above the PF curve or the SN curve the system has
three steady states. The PF curve is non-generic and only arises in the symmetric case
with mean bias 0 = 0. When the symmetry is broken by perturbing the mean bias to





Figure 1.7 shows a 2-dimensional bifurcation diagram in the (;1) parameter
plane, where 1 represents the mean of the rst order stochastic trend variable
#01 in the forecasting rule (1.3.4). Recall that 0 is the mean of the constant
term #00 in the forecasting rule (1.3.4); it models the `mean bias' of the trader
type. When 0 = 0 and a2zs = 0 (expressing that the risk premium is zero), the
LTL is symmetric with respect to the fundamental steady state.28 COMPLEX EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
In the symmetric case ( dotted lines in gure 1.7), for parameters taking val-
ues in the region enclosed by the Hopf, period doubling (PD) and pitchfork (PF)
bifurcation curves, the fundamental steady state is unique and stable18. As the
parameters cross the PF curve, two additional non-fundamental steady states are
created, one above and one below the fundamental. Another route to instability
occurs when crossing the Hopf curve, where the fundamental steady state becomes
unstable and a (stable) invariant circle with periodic or quasi-periodic dynamics
is created. The pitchfork bifurcation curve is non-generic, and only occurs in the
symmetric case. When the symmetry is broken by a non-zero mean bias 0 6= 0,
as illustrated in gure 1.7 (bold curves) for 0 =  0:1, the PF curve disappears,
and \breaks" into two generic co-dimension one bifurcation curves, a Hopf and a
saddle-node (SN) bifurcation curve. When crossing the SN curve from below, two
additional steady states are created, one stable and one unstable. Notice that, as
illustrated in gure 1.7, when the perturbation is small (in the gure 0 =  0:1),
the SN and the Hopf curves are close to the PF and the Hopf curves (dotted lines) in
the symmetric case. In this sense the bifurcation diagram depends continuously on
the parameters, and it is useful to consider the symmetric LTL as an \organizing"
center to study bifurcation phenomena in the generic, non-symmetric LTL.
The most relevant case from an economic viewpoint arises when the mean 1 of
the rst order coecient #01 in the forecasting rule (1.3.4) satises 0  1  1. In
that case, the (fundamental) steady state loses stability in a Hopf bifurcation as 
increases. Figure 1.8 illustrates the dynamical behavior of the LTL as the parameter
 further increases. After the Hopf bifurcation periodic and quasi-periodic dynamics
on a stable invariant circle occur, and for increasing values of  a bifurcation route
to strange attractors occurs. Figure 1.8 thus presents numerical evidence of the
occurrence of a rational route to randomness, that is, a bifurcation route to strange
attractors as the intensity of choice to switch forecasting strategies increases. If such
rational routes to randomness occur for the LTL, the LTL convergence theorem
implies that in evolutionary systems with many trader types rational routes to
randomness occur with high probability.
Diks and van der Weide (2003,2005) have generalized the notion of LTL and
introduced so-called Continuous Belief Systems (CBS), where the beliefs of traders
are distributed according to a continuous density function. The beliefs distribution
function and the equilibrium prices co-evolve over time. The LTL theory discussed
here as well as its extensions can be used to form a bridge between an analytical
approach and the literature on evolutionary articial market simulation models
reviewed in LeBaron (2000,2006).
18See the appendix for a brief introduction to bifurcation theory, illustrated by simple examples
of the saddle-node, period doubling, pitchfork and Hopf bifurcations.EMPIRICAL VALIDATION 29
(a)  = 1:4 (b)  = 1:51 (c)  = 1:52
(d)  = 1:57 (e)  = 1:59 (f)  = 1:6
Figure 1.8. Attractors in the phase space for the 5-D LTL with parameters R = 1:01,
z
s = 0, 0 = 0, 1 = 0, 2 = 3 = 0, 0 = 1 = 2 = 3 = 1: (a) immediately after
the Hopf bifurcation (quasi-)periodic dynamics on a stable invariant circle occurs; (b-c)
after a Hopf bifurcation (quasi-)periodic dynamics on a stable invariant torus occurs; (d-f)
breaking up of the invariant torus into a strange attractor.
1.4 EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
In this section we discuss the empirical validity of the asset pricing model with
heterogeneous beliefs. There is already a large literature on heterogeneous agent
models (HAMs) replicating many of the important stylized facts of nancial time
series on short time scales (say daily or higher frequency), such as fat tails and
long memory in the returns distribution and clustered volatility. Examples of het-
erogeneous agent models able to replicate stylized facts of nancial markets in-
clude e.g. Brock and LeBaron (1996), Arthur et al. (1997), Brock and Hommes
(1997b), Youssefmir and Huberman (1997), LeBaron et al. (1999), Lux and March-
esi (1999,2000), Farmer and Joshi (2002), Kirman and Teyssi ere (2002), Hommes
(2002), Iori (2002), Cont and Bouchaud (2000) and Gaunersdorfer and Hommes
(2007). The recent survey by Lux (2009, this Handbook) contains an extensive
survey of behavioral interacting agent models mimicking the stylized facts of as-
set returns. We have already seen examples of simple heterogeneous agent models30
mimicking temporary bubbles and crashes. In this section we discuss how these
qualitative features match with observed bubbles and crashes in real markets.
Empirical validation and estimation of HAMs on economic or nancial data is
still in its infancy. An early attempt has already been made by Shiller (1984), who
presents a HAM with smart money traders, having rational expectations, versus
ordinary investors (whose behavior is in fact not modeled at all). Shiller estimates
the fraction of smart money investors over the period 1900-1983, and nds consid-
erable 
uctuations of the fraction over a range between 0 and 50%. Baak (1999)
and Chavas (2000) estimate HAMs on hog and beef market data, and found evi-
dence for the heterogeneity of expectations. Winker and Gilli (2001) and Gilli and
Winker (2003) estimate the model of Kirman (1991,1993) with fundamentalists
and chartists, using the daily DM-US$ exchange rates 1991-2000. Their estimated
parameter values correspond to a bimodal distribution of agents. Westerho and
Reitz (2003) also estimate an HAM with fundamentalists and chartists to exchange
rates and nd considerable 
uctuations of the market impact of fundamentalists.
Alfarano et al. (2005) estimate an agent-based herding model where agents switch
between fundamentalist and chartist strategies. Branch (2004) estimates a model
with heterogeneous beliefs and time varying fractions, using survey data on in
a-
tion expectations. In this section, we discuss the estimation of a simple two type
asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs, as discussed in section 1.1, on yearly
S&P 500 data, 1871-2003, as done in Boswijk et al. (2007). As we will see, this
simple 2-type model can e.g. explain the dot com bubble in the late 1990s and the
subsequent crash early 200019.
1.4.1 The model in price-to-cash 
ows
In the previous section, the dividend process of the risky asset has been assumed
to be stationary. To estimate the model using yearly data of more than a century,
the dividend process has to be taken growing over time and thus non-stationary. In
order to estimate a simple 2-type model, Boswijk et al. (2007) therefore reformu-
lated the model in terms of price-to-cash 
ows. Recall from (1.1.5) that, under the







nh;tEh;t(pt+1 + yt+1); (1.4.1)
19Van Norden and Schaller (1999) estimate a nonlinear time series switching model with two
regimes, an explosive and a collapsing bubble regime, with the probability of being in the explosive
regime depends negatively on the relative absolute deviation of the bubble from the fundamental.
Brooks and Katsaris (2005) extend this model to three regimes, adding a third dormant bubble






Eh;t[pt+1 + yt+1   pt]
pt
: (1.4.2)
In equilibrium the average required rate of return for investors to hold the risky
asset equals the discount rate r. In the estimation of the model the discount rate
r has been set equal to the sum of the (risk free) interest rate and the required
risk premium on stocks. A simple, non-stationary process that ts cash 
ow data
(dividends or earnings) well is a stochastic process with a constant growth rate.
More precisely, assume that logyt is a Gaussian random walk with drift, that is,











 = (1 + g)"t+1; (1.4.4)
where g = e+ 1
2
2
   1 and "t+1 = et+1+ 1
2
2
, so that Et("t+1) = 1. As before, we
assume that all types have correct beliefs on the cash 
ow, that is,
Eh;t[yt+1] = Et[yt+1] = (1 + g)ytEt["t+1] = (1 + g)yt: (1.4.5)
Since the cash 
ow is an exogenously given stochastic process it seems natural to
assume that agents have learned the correct beliefs on next period's cash 
ow yt+1.
In particular, boundedly rational agents can learn about the constant growth rate
e.g. by running a simple regression of log(yt=yt 1) on a constant. In contrast,
prices are determined endogenously and are aected by expectations about next
period's price. In a heterogeneous world, agreement about future prices therefore
seems more unlikely than agreement about future cash 
ows. Therefore we assume
homogeneous beliefs about future cash 
ow, but heterogeneous beliefs about future
prices.20 The pricing equation (1.4.1) can be reformulated in terms of price-to-
cash-














In the special case when all agents have rational expectations the equilibrium pric-
ing equation (1.4.1) simplies to pt = (1=(1 + r))Et(pt+1 + yt+1). It is well known
20Barberis et al. (1998) consider a model where agents are aected by psychological biases in
forming expectations about future cash 
ows. In particular, agents may overreact to good news
about economic fundamentals because they believe that cash 
ows have moved into another regime
with higher growth. Their model is able to explain continuation and reversal of stock returns.
21In what follows we will use either price-to-dividend (P/D) or price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio's,
and use the general notation P/Y for price-to-cash-
ows.32
that, in the case of a constant discount rate r and a constant growth rate g for div-
idends, according to the static Gordon growth model (Gordon, 1962), the rational
expectations fundamental price, p





yt; r > g: (1.4.7)
Equivalently, in terms of price-to-cash 










We will refer to p
t as the fundamental price and to 
t as the fundamental P/Y-ratio.
When all agents are rational the pricing equation (1.4.6) in terms of the P/Y-ratio,
t = pt=yt, becomes
t =
1
R f1 + Et[t+1]g: (1.4.9)
In terms of the deviation from the fundamental ratio, xt = t   





Under heterogeneity in expectations, the pricing equation (1.4.6) is expressed in








The expectation of belief type h about next period P/Y-ratio is expressed as
Eh;t[t+1] = Et[
t+1] + fh(xt 1;:::;xt L) = m + fh(xt 1;:::;xt L); (1.4.12)
where 
t represents the fundamental price-to-cash-
ow ratio P/Y, Et(
t+1) = m is
the rational expectation of the P/Y-ratio available to all agents, xt is the deviation
of the P/Y-ratio from its fundamental value and fh() represents the expected
transitory deviation of the P/Y-ratio from the fundamental value, depending on L
past deviations. The information available to investors at time t includes present
and past cash 
ows and past prices. In terms of deviations from the fundamental
P/Y-ratio, xt, we get
Eh;t[xt+1] = fh(xt 1;:::;xt L): (1.4.13)
Note again that the rational expectations, fundamental benchmark is nested in the
heterogeneous agent model as a special case when fh  0 for all types h. We can





From this equilibrium equation it is clear that the adjustment towards the funda-
mental P/Y-ratio will be slow if a majority of investors has persistent beliefs about
it.
Evolutionary selection of expectations
In addition to the empirical evidence of persistent deviations from fundamentals
there is also signicant evidence of time variation in the sentiment of investors.
This has been documented, for example, by Shiller (1987,2000) using survey data.
In the model considered here, agents are boundedly rational and switch between
dierent forecasting strategies according to recently realized prots. We denote by
h;t 1 the realized prots of type h at the end of period t 1, given by (cf. 1.1.14)




where Rt 1 = pt 1 + yt 1   (1 + r)pt 2 is the realized excess return at time t   1
and zh;t 2 is the demand of the risky asset by belief type h, as given in (1.1.3),
formed in period t 2. As before, we assume that the beliefs about the conditional
variance of excess returns are the same for all types and equal to fundamentalists
beliefs about conditional variance, i.e.
Vh;t 2[Rt 1] = Vt 2[P
t 1 + yt 1   (1 + r)P
t 2] = y2
t 22; (1.4.16)
where 2 = (1+m)2(1+g)2Vt 2[t 1], with t IID noise driving the cash 
ow. The
tness measure can be rewritten in terms of the deviation xt = t   m of the P/Y
ratio from its fundamental value, with m = (1 + g)=(r   g) as
h;t 1 =
(1 + g)2
a2 (xt 1   Rxt 2)(Eh;t 2[xt 1]   Rxt 2): (1.4.17)
This tness measure has a simple, intuitive explanation in terms of forecasting
performance for next period's deviation from the fundamental. A positive demand
zh;t 2 may be seen as a bet that xt 1 would go up more than what was expected on
average from Rxt 2 (note that R is the growth rate of rational bubble solutions).
The realized tness h;t 1 of strategy h is the realized prot from that bet and it
will be positive if both the realized deviation xt 1 > Rxt 2 and the forecast of
the deviation Eh;t 2[xt 1] > Rxt 2. More generally, if both the realized absolute
deviation jxt 1j and the absolute predicted deviation jEh;t 2[xt 1]j to the funda-
mental value are larger than R times the absolute deviation jxt 2j, then strategy
h generates positive realized tness. In contrast, a strategy that wrongly predicts
whether the asset price mean reverts back towards the fundamental value or moves
away from the fundamental generates a negative realized tness.
At the beginning of period t investors compare the realized relative performances
of the dierent strategies and withdraw capital from those that performed poorly34
and move it to better strategies. The fractions nh;t evolve according to a discrete













where  > 0 is the intensity of choice as before, and 
h;k
t 1 = h;t 1   k;t 1
denotes the dierence in realized prots of belief type h compared to type k.
1.4.2 Estimation of a simple two-type example
Consider the case of two types, both predicting next period's deviation by extrap-
olating past realizations in a linear fashion, that is22
Eh;t[xt+1] = fh(xt 1) = 'hxt 1: (1.4.19)
The dynamic asset pricing model with two types can then be written as
Rxt = nt'1xt 1 + (1   nt)'2xt 1 + t; (1.4.20)
where '1 and '2 denote the coecients of the two belief types, nt represents the
fraction of investors that belong to the rst type of traders and t represents a
disturbance term. The value of the parameter 'h can be interpreted as follows. If
it is positive and smaller than 1, investors expect the stock price to mean revert
towards the fundamental value. This type of agents represent fundamentalists,
because they expect the asset price to move back towards its fundamental value in
the long run. The closer 'h is to 1 the more persistent are the expected deviations.
If the beliefs parameter 'h is larger than 1, it implies that investors believe the
deviation of the stock prices to grow over time at a constant speed. We will refer
to this type of agents as trend followers. Note in particular that when one group
of investors believes in a strong trend, i.e. 'h > R, this may cause asset prices to
deviate further from their fundamental value. In the case with 2 types with linear
beliefs (1.4.19), the fraction of type 1 investors is
nt =
1
1 + expf  [('1   '2)xt 3(xt 1   Rxt 2)]g
(1.4.21)
where  = (1 + g)2=(a2).
The two-type model (1.4.20) and (1.4.21) has been estimated, using an updated
version of the data set described in Shiller (1989), consisting of annual observations
of the S&P500 index from 1871 to 2003. Here we present the estimation results
22In the estimation of the model higher order lags turned out to be insignicant, so we focus on
the simplest case with only one lag in the function fh(), with 'h the parameter characterizing
the strategy of type h.35
with earnings as cash 
ows, but using dividends as cash 
ows gives similar results.
The valuation ratios are then the Price-to-Earnings (PE) ratios.23
Recall that according to the static Gordon growth model the fundamental price
is given by
p




The fundamental value of the asset is a multiple m of its cash 
ow where m depends
on the discount rate r and the cash 
ow growth rate g. The multiple m can also
be interpreted as the price-to-dividend (P/D) or the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios
implied by the present value model. Figure 1.9 shows the (log) of yearly S&P 500
data together with the fundamental benchmark as well as their P/E-ratio's. The
gure shows a clear long-term co-movement of the stock price and the fundamental
value. However, the P/E-ratio takes persistent swings away from the constant value
predicted by the present value model. This suggests that the fundamental value
does not account completely for the dynamics of stock prices, as was suggested in
the early debate on mean reversion by Summers (1986). A survey of the on-going
debate is given in Campbell and Shiller (2005). Here we use the simple constant
growth Gordon model for the fundamental price and estimate the two type model
on deviations from this benchmark.24
Recall that R = (1 + r)=(1 + g), where g is the constant growth rate of the
cash 
ow and r is the discount rate r equal to the risk free interest rate plus a
risk premium. We use an estimate of the risk premium {the dierence between the
expected return on the market portfolio of common stocks and the risk-free interest
rate{ to obtain R, as in Fama and French (2002). The risk premium sases
RP = g + y=p   i; (1.4.23)
where g is the growth rate of dividends, y=p denotes the average dividend yield
yt=pt 1 and i is the risk free interest rate. For annual data from 1871 to 2003 of
the S&P500 the estimates are i = 2:57% and RP = 6:56%, so that r = 9:13%
and R = 1:074.25 The corresponding average price-to-earnings ratio is 13:4, as
illustrated in Figure 1.9.
Using yearly data of the S&P 500 index from 1871 to 2003, the parameters
('0
1;'0
2;) in the 2-type model (1.4.20) and (1.4.21) can be estimated by nonlinear
least squares. The estimation results are as follows:
23Since earnings data are noisy, to determine the fundamental valuation we follow the practice
of Campbell and Shiller (2005) to smooth earnings by a 10 years moving average.
24The same approach can be used for more general, time varying fundamental processes. Manzan
(2003) shows that a dynamic Gordon model for the fundamental price, where the discount rate
r and/or the growth rate g are time varying does not explain the large 
uctuations in price-to-
cash-
ow ratios, and in fact yields a fundamental price pattern close to that for the static Gordon
model. Boswijk et al. (2007) also estimate a version of the model allowing for time variation in
the growth rate of the cash 
ow, and obtain similar results.
25These estimates are slightly dierent from Fama and French (2002), because as in Shiller
(1989), we use the CPI index to de
ate nominal values.36
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Figure 1.9. Yearly S&P 500, 1871-2003 and benchmark fundamental p

t = myt, with
m = (1 + g)=(1 + r). The left panel shows logs of S&P 500 and the log of the funda-
mental p





Rxt = ntf0:80 xt 1g + (1   nt)f1:097xt 1g + b t
(0:074) (0:052) (1.4.24)
nt = f1 + exp[ 7:54 ( 0:29xt 3)(xt 1   Rxt 2)]g 1
(4:93)
R
2=0:77; AIC=2:23; AICAR(1)=2:29; 'AR(1)=0:983; QLB(4)=0:94; F
boot(p-value)=10:15 (0:011)
The belief coecients are strongly signicant and dierent from each other. On
the other hand, the intensity of choice  is not signicantly dierent from zero.
This is a common result in nonlinear switching-type regression models, where the
parameter  in the transition function is dicult to estimate and has a large
standard deviation, because relatively large changes in  cause only small variation
of the fraction nt. Ter asvirta (1994) argues that this should not be worrying as
long as there is signicant heterogeneity in the estimated regimes. The nonlinear
switching model achieves a lower value for the AIC selection criterion compared to
a linear AR(1) model. This suggests that the model is capturing nonlinearity in the
data. This is also conrmed by the bootstrap F-test for linearity, which strongly
rejects the null hypothesis of linearity in favor of the heterogeneous agent model.
The residuals of the regression do not show signicant evidence of autocorrelation
at the 5% signicance level.
The estimated coecient of the rst regime is 0.80, corresponding to an half-
life of about three years. The rst regime can be characterized as fundamentalist
beliefs, expecting the asset price to move back towards its fundamental value. In
contrast, the second regime has an estimated coecient close to 1.1, implying that
in this regime agents are trend followers, believing the deviation of the stock price37















Figure 1.10. Estimated fraction nt of fundamentalists (left) and average extrapolation factor
't (right) in (1.4.25) in 2-type model.
to grow over time at a constant speed larger than R  1:074. At times when the
fraction of investors using this belief is equal or close to 1 we have explosive behavior
in the P/E ratio. The sentiment of investors switches between a stable fundamen-
talists regime and a trend following regime. In normal periods agents consider the
deviation as a temporary phenomenon and expect it to revert back to fundamentals
quickly. In other periods, a rapid increase of stock prices not paralleled by improve-
ments in the fundamentals causes losses for fundamentalists and prots for trend
followers. Evolutionary pressure will then cause more fundamentalists to become
trend followers, thus reenforcing the trend in prices.
Figure 1.10 shows the time series of the fraction of fundamentalists and the
average market sentiment, dened as
't =
nt'1 + (1   nt)'2
R : (1.4.25)
It is clear that the fraction of fundamentalists varies considerably over time with
periods in which it is close to 0.5 and other periods in which it is close to either
of the extremes 0 or 1. The series of the average market sentiment shows that
there is signicant time variation between periods of strong mean reversion when
the market is dominated by fundamentalist and other periods in which 't is close
to or exceeds 1 and the market is dominated by trend followers. These plots also
oer an explanation of the events of the late 1990s: for six consecutive years the
trend following strategy outperformed the fundamentalists strategy and a majority
of agents switched to the trend following strategy, driving the average market senti-
ment beyond 1 thus reenforcing the strong price trend. However, at the turn of the
market in 2000 the fraction of fundamentalists increased again, approaching 1 thus
contributing to the reversal toward the fundamental value in subsequent years.
The estimation results show that there are two dierent belief strategies: one38
in which agents expect continuation of returns and the other in which they expect
reversal. We also nd that there are some years in which one type of expectations
dominates the market. It is clear that the expectation of continuation of positive
returns dominated the market in the late 1990s, with the average market sentiment
coecient 't in (1.4.25)) larger than 1 in the late 1990s. Despite the awareness of
the mispricing, in this period investors were aggressively extrapolating the contin-
uation of the extraordinary performances realized in the past years. Our approach
endogenizes the switching of agents among beliefs. The evolutionary mechanism
that relates predictor choice to their past performance is supported by the data. It
conrms also previous evidence that pointed in this direction. Based on answers to
a survey, Shiller (2000) constructed indices of \Bubble Expectations" and of \In-
vestor Condence". In both cases, he nds that the time variation in the indices
is well explained by the lagged change in stock prices. Based on a dierent survey,
Fisher and Statman (2002) nd that in the late 1990s individual investors had ex-
pectations of continuation of recent stock returns while institutional investors were
expecting reversals. This is an interesting approach to identify heterogeneity of
beliefs based on the type of investors rather than the type of beliefs. In the view
of our model, the bubble in the 1990s was triggered by good news about economic
fundamentals (a new internet technology), and strongly reinforced by trend extrap-
olating behaviour. The bubble reversed by bad news about economic fundamentals
(excessive growth can not last forever and is not supported by earnings), and the
crash was accelerated by switching of beliefs back to fundamentals.
1.4.3 Empirical implications
In this subsection we discuss some empirical implications of the estimation of our
nonlinear evolutionary switching model with heterogeneous beliefs. First, we inves-
tigate the response to a positive shock to fundamentals when the asset is overvalued.
Secondly, we address the question concerning the probability that a bubble may
resume by considering the evolution of the valuation ratios conditional on data
until the end of 2003. These simulation experiments both show the importance of
considering nonlinear eects in the dynamics of stock prices.
Response to a Fundamental Shock
We use the estimated parameters to investigate the response of the market valua-
tion to good news. Assume that at the beginning of period t the cash 
ow increases
due to a permanent increase in its growth rate. This implies that the asset has
a higher fundamental valuation ratio, but what is the eect on the market valua-
tion? We address this question both for the nonlinear switching model and a linear
benchmark. The linear model may be interpreted as a model with a representative
agent believing in an average mean reversion towards the fundamental26. Assume
26The linear benchmark is e.g. obtained for  = 0 or equivalently, when both fractions nt =
1 nt = 0:5 in (1.4.20). Hence, in the linear model there is no strategy switching between dierent39







Figure 1.11. Average response (over 2000 simulations) to a shock to the fundamental for
the linear representative agent model (dashed line) and the nonlinear 2-type switching model
(dotted line with circles). At period 0 there is a permanent shock to the fundamental price
from 15 to 17. The simulation uses the estimated parameter values for the P/D-ratio, with a
representative agent average belief parameter ' = 0:968 and heterogeneous agent parameters
'1 = 0:762 and '2 = 1:135 for the 2 types. The nonlinear heterogeneous agent model exhibits
short-run continuation of positive returns and long-term reversal.
that at t   1 the fundamental valuation ratio was 15 and the good news at time t
drives it to 17. Assume also that the equilibrium price at t 1 was 16. Figure 1.11
shows the valuation ratio dynamics in response to the good news for both the linear
and the nonlinear switching models.
The Figure shows the average price path over 2000 simulations of the estimated
model. There is a clear dierence between the linear and the nonlinear model. In
the linear case, the positive shock to the fundamental value leads to an immediate
increase of the price followed by mean-reversion thereafter. In contrast, for the
nonlinear heterogeneous agent model, the pattern that emerges is consistent with
the evidence of short-run continuation of positive returns and long-term reversal.
After good news, the agents incorporate the news into their expectations and they
expect that part of the previous period overvaluation will persist. One group {the
trend followers{ overreacts and expects a further increase of the price, while the
other group {the fundamentalists{ expects the price to diminish over time. The
equilibrium price at time t overshoots and almost reaches 18. In the following two
periods trend followers continue to buy the stock and drive its price and its valuation
ratio even higher. Finally, the reversal starts and drives the ratio back to its long
run fundamental value. Initially, the aggressive investors interpret the positive news
as a conrmation that the stock overvaluation was justied by forthcoming news.
types, but rather a representative agent with a linear forecasting rule.40


























Figure 1.12. Prediction of P/E-ratios 5 years ahead, based on linear representative agent
model (right) and nonlinear 2-type switching model (left). The estimated belief parameters
are: ' = 0:983 for the representative agent and '1 = 0:80 and '2 = 1:097 for the 2-type
switching model. The quantiles corresponding to 10, 30, 50, 70 and 90% probability over 2000
replications are shown. The realized P/E-ratios 2004-2006 are also indicated, and show that
the realized P/E-ratio for 2006 falls outside the 10% quantile of the linear model.
However, the lack of further good news convinces most investors to switch back
to the mean reverting expectations and the stock price is driven back towards the
fundamental.
Will the bubble resume?
As a model forecasting exercise, we simulate the evolution of the valuation ratios
using the estimated heterogeneous agent model. We will then obtain the predicted
evolution of the valuation ratio conditional on the value realized at the end of
2003. Innovations are obtained by reshuing the estimated residuals. Instead
of focusing our attention only on the mean or the median of the distribution we
consider the quantiles corresponding to 10, 30, 50, 70 and 90% probability over
2000 replications of the estimated model in (1.4.24) for the P/E ratio. In addition
to the quantiles predicted by our nonlinear model we also plot those predicted by
the linear representative agent model. Figure 1.12 shows the 1 to 5 periods ahead
quantiles of the predictive distribution for the estimated model.
The linear model (right plot) predicts that the valuation ratio reverts back
toward the mean at all quantiles considered. In contrast, the nonlinear switching
model predicts that there is a signicant probability that the ratio may increase
again as a result of the activation of the trend following regime. The 70% and
90% quantiles clearly show that the PD-ratio may increase again to levels close toLABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 41
35. Stated dierently, our heterogeneous agent model predicts that with probability
over 30% the PD-ratio may increase to more than 30. Note however that the median
predicts that the ratio should decrease as implied by the linear mean reverting
model. Another implication of our model is that if the rst (mean reverting) regime
dominates the beliefs of investors, it will enforce a much faster adjustment than
predicted by the linear model. This is clear from the bottom quantiles of the
distributions. These simulations show that predictions from a linear, representative
agent model versus a nonlinear, heterogeneous agent model are quite dierent. In
particular, extreme events with large deviations from the benchmark fundamental
valuation are much more likely in a nonlinear world.
1.5 LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS
Asset pricing models with heterogeneous beliefs exhibit interesting dynamics char-
acterized by temporary bubbles and crashes, triggered by news about fundamentals
and reinforced by self-fullling expectations and trend following investment strate-
gies. While the previous section focussed on the empirical relevance of such models,
this section confronts the model with data from laboratory experiments with hu-
man subjects. Laboratory experiments are well suited to discipline the class of
behavioral modes (or heuristics) boundedly rational subjects may use in economic
decision making. Here, we discuss a number of \learning to forecast experiments",
where subjects must forecast the price of an asset whose realized market price is
an aggregation of individual expectations.
In real markets, it is hard to obtain detailed information about investors' in-
dividual expectations. One approach is to collect survey data on individual ex-
pectations, as done for example by Turnovsky (1970) on expectations about the
Consumers' Price Index and the unemployment rate during the post-Korean war
period. Frankel and Froot (1987ab, 1990ab), Allen and Taylor (1990), Ito (1990)
and Taylor and Allen (1992) use a survey on exchange rate expectations, and con-
clude that nancial practitioners use dierent forecasting and trading strategies. A
consistent nding from survey data is that at short horizons investors tend to use
extrapolative chartists' trading rules, whereas at longer horizons investors tend to
use mean reverting fundamentalists' trading rules. Shiller (1987,1990,2000) ana-
lyzes surveys on expectations about stock market prices and real estate prices and
nds evidence for time variation in investors' sentiment; see also Vissing-Jorgensen
(2003).
Laboratory experiments with human subjects provide an alternative, comple-
mentary approach to study the interaction of individual expectations and the re-
sulting aggregate outcomes. An important advantage of the experimental approach
is that the experimenter has full control over the underlying economic fundamen-
tals. Surprisingly little experimental work focussing on expectation formation in
markets has been done. Williams (1987) considers expectation formation in an ex-
perimental double auction market which varies from period to period by small shifts42
in the market clearing price. Participants predict the mean contract price for 4 or
5 consecutive periods. The participant with the lowest forecast error earns $1.00.
In Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) expectations and the occurrence of spec-
ulative bubbles are studied in an experimental asset market. In a series of papers,
Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) and Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994, 1995)
studied expectation formation in in
ationary overlapping generations economies.
Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) nd experimental evidence for expectationally
driven cycles and coordination of beliefs on a sunspot 2-cycle equilibrium, but only
after agents have been exposed to exogenous shocks of a similar kind. Marimon
and Sunder (1995) present experimental evidence that a \simple" rule, such as a
constant growth of the money supply, can help coordinate agents' beliefs and help
stabilize the economy. Duy (2006, 2007) gives stimulating surveys of laboratory
experiments in various macro settings and how individual and aggregate behavior
could be explained by agent-based models.
Most of these papers however can not be viewed as pure experimental testing of
the expectations hypothesis, everything else being constant, because in the exper-
iments dynamic market equilibrium is aected not only by expectations feedback
but also by other types of human decisions, such as trading behavior. A num-
ber of laboratory experiments have focussed on expectation formation exclusively.
Schmalensee (1976) presented subjects with historical data on wheat prices and
asked them to predict the mean wheat price for the next 5 periods. In Dwyer et
al. (1993) and Hey (1994) subjects had to predict a time series generated by a
stochastic process such as a random walk or a simple linear rst order autoregres-
sive process; in the last two papers no economic context was given. Kelley and
Friedman (2002) consider learning in an Orange Juice Futures price forecasting ex-
periment, where prices are driven by a linear stochastic process with two exogenous
variables (weather and competing supply). A drawback common to these papers is
that the historical or stochastic price series are exogenous and there is no feedback
from subjects' forecasting behavior.
1.5.1 Learning to forecast experiments
In the remaining part of this section we mainly focus on the learning to forecast
experiments in Hommes et al. (2005). In these experiments, subjects forecast the
price of a risky asset which is determined by market clearing with feedback from
individual expectations. Similar experiments have been performed by van de Velden
(2001), Gerber et al. (2002), Sutan and Willinger (2005), Adam (2007), Hommes
et al. (2007) and Heemeijer (2007); see also the recent survey in Duy (2007). We
are particularly interested in the following questions:
1. How do boundedly rational agents form individual expectations and how do
they learn in a heterogeneous world?
2. How do individual forecasting rules interact and what is the aggregate out-LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 43
come of these interactions?
3. Will coordination occur, even when there is limited market information?
4. Does learning enforce convergence to rational expectations equilibrium?
In real nancial markets traders are involved in two related activities: predic-
tion and trade. Traders make a prediction concerning the future price of an asset,
and given this prediction, they make a trading decision. In the experiments dis-
cussed here subjects' only task is to forecast prices; asset trading is computerized
and derived from optimal demand (from mean-variance maximization), given the
individual forecast. The experiments can therefore be seen as learning to fore-
cast experiments (Marimon and Sunder 1994, p.134), in contrast to learning to
solve intertemporal optimization problems or, more concisely, learning to optimize
experiments (Duy 2006, p.4), where participants are asked to submit their de-
cisions (e.g. trading or consumption quantities), while their private beliefs about
future developments remain implicit. Learning to forecast experiments provide us
with `clean' data on expectations, which can be used to test various expectations
hypotheses.
In the experiments each participant is told that he is an advisor to a pension
fund, with the only task to predict next period's price of a risky asset. Earnings











where 1300 points is equivalent to 0:5 Euro, and earnings are zero in period t when
jpt   pe
htj  7. Subjects are informed that their pension fund needs to decide how
much to invest in a risk free asset paying a risk free gross rate of return R = 1+r,
where r is the real interest rate, and how much to invest in shares of an innitely
lived risky asset. The risky asset pays uncertain IID dividends yt with mean y. The
mean dividend y and the interest rate r are common knowledge, so that the subjects
could compute the (constant) fundamental p = y=r = 3=0:05 = 60. Subjects know
that the price of the asset is determined by market clearing. Although they do
not know the exact underlying market clearing equation, they have qualitative
information about the market and are informed that the higher their forecast, the
larger will be the fraction of money of their pension fund invested in the risky
asset and the larger will be the demand for stocks. They do not know the exact
investment strategy of their pension fund and the investment strategies of the other
pension funds. They also do not know the number of pension funds (which is 6) or
the identity of the other members of the group.
The experiment lasts for 51 periods. In every period t the participants have
to predict the price pt+1 of the risky asset in period t + 1, given the available
information consisting of past prices pt 1;pt 2;:::;p1 and the participants' own
past individual predictions pe
ht;pe
h;t 1;:::;pe
h1. Notice that the participants have to
make a two period ahead forecast for pt+1, since pt 1 is the latest price observation44
available. Subjects are told that their price forecast has to be between 0 and 100
for every period. In periods 1 and 2 no information about past prices is available.
At the end of period t, when all predictions for period t + 1 have been submitted,
the participants are informed about the price in period t and earnings for that
period are revealed. On their computer screen the subjects are informed about
their earnings in the previous period, total earnings, a table of the last twenty
prices and their corresponding predictions and time series of the prices and their
predictions. Subjects have no information about earnings and predictions of others.
1.5.2 The price generating mechanism
The asset market is populated by 6 pension funds and a small fraction of fundamen-
talist robot traders. Each pension fund h is matched with a participant and makes
an investment decision at time t based upon this participant's prediction pe
h;t+1 of
the asset price. The fundamentalist trader always predicts the fundamental price
pf and trades based upon this prediction.
The realized asset price in the experiment is determined by market clearing, with
the pension fund's asset demand derived from mean-variance maximization given
their advisor's forecast, as in the standard asset pricing model with heterogeneous
beliefs (e.g. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), Brock and Hommes (1998), see










h;t+1 is the average forecast for period t+1 of the 6 partici-
pants, nt is the time varying weight of the fundamentalist traders and "t is a noise
term, representing (small) stochastic demand and supply shocks. Note that the
realized asset price pt at time t is determined by the individual price predictions
ph;t+1 for time t + 1. Therefore, when traders have to make a prediction for the
price in period t + 1 they do not know the price in period t yet, and they can only
use information on prices up till time t   1.
The weight nt of the fundamental traders in the market is endogenous and
depends positively upon the absolute distance between the asset price and the
fundamental value according to





 pt 1   pf 

: (1.5.3)
The greater this distance the more the fundamental trader will buy or short the
asset. The fundamentalist trader therefore acts as a `stabilizing force' pushing prices
in the direction of the fundamental price. Their presence excludes the possibility
of ever lasting speculative bubbles in asset prices27. Also note that nt = 0, if
pt 1 = pf.

































Figure 1.13. Realized prices under some benchmark expectation rules. Top panel: under
rational expectations prices remain very close to the fundamental price 60; Bottom left: under
naive expectations prices converge monotonically, but slowly, towards the fundamental price;
Bottom right: under a simple linear AR-2 rule p
e
t+1 = (pt 1 + 60)=2 + (pt 1   pt 2), which
may be interpreted as an anchor and adjustment rule, prices exhibit persistent oscillations.
An important feature of the asset pricing model is its self-conrming nature or
positive feedback: if all traders make a high (low) prediction the realized price will
also be high (low). This feature is characteristic for speculative asset markets: if
traders expect a high price, the demand for the risky asset will be high, and as
a consequence the realized market price will be high, assuming that the supply is
xed.
1.5.3 Benchmark expectations rules
Figure 1.13 shows the price dynamics under three benchmark expectation rules:
rational expectations, naive expectations and a trend extrapolation rule. In the
rational expectations benchmarks all agents forecast the price to be equal to its
fundamentalists and chartists. In the same spirit Kyle and Xiong (2001) introduce a long-term
investor that holds a risky asset in an amount proportional to the spread between the asset price
and its fundamental value. Since in the experiments the fundamental value is pf = 60, the weight





 0:26. The weight of the
other traders is the same for each trader and equal to (1   nt)=6  0:17.46
fundamental value pf = 60.28 Realized prices are then given by




Hence, under rational expectations prices exhibit small random 
uctuations around
the fundamental price pf = 60. This outcome of the experiment should probably
not be expected right from the start, but perhaps subjects can learn to coordinate
on the rational, fundamental forecast.
Under naive expectations all participants use the last observed price as their
forecast, that is, pe
h;t+1 = pt 1. The asset price then converges monotonically
towards the fundamental price, as illustrated in Figure 1.13. Finally, Figure 1.13






+ pt 1   pt 2: (1.5.5)
If all subjects use the forecasting rule (1.5.5), realized market prices will 
uctuate for
50 periods. This simple rule may be viewed as an anchor and adjustment heuristic,
following the terminology of Tversky and Kahnemann (1974), since it uses an anchor
(the average of the fundamental price and the last observed price) and extrapolates
the last price change from there. One may wonder how subjects would arrive at
this anchor, if they do not know the fundamental, but quite surprisingly a number
of subjects used a rule very similar to (1.5.5).
1.5.4 Aggregate behavior
Figure 1.14 shows time series of the realized asset prices and individual predictions
in the experiments for ve dierent groups. The rst three groups illustrate the
three typical qualitatively dierent outcomes in the treatment with robot traders:
i) monotonic convergence: the price converges monotonically to the fundamen-
tal price from below;
ii) persistent oscillations: the price oscillates with more or less constant ampli-
tude; there is no convergence of the price to its fundamental value.
iii) dampened oscillations: the price oscillates around the fundamental price,
with large amplitude initially but the amplitude decreases over time indicat-
ing (slow) convergence to the fundamental price.
The last two groups in Figure 1.14 illustrate what happens in a dierent treat-
ment of the experiments without fundamental robot traders. When there are no
fundamental robot traders present in the market, persistent price oscillations with
large amplitude typically occur. The dierence between these last two groups lies in
28Recall that participants know the values of y and r, and therefore have enough information



































































































































































group 4, no robot, upper bound 1000
Figure 1.14. Realized prices (left) and individual predictions (right) in ve typical asset pricing
experiments. The fundamental price p
f = 60 is indicated by a horizontal line. The rst three
examples illustrate three dierent outcomes in the experiments with robot traders: monotonic
convergence, persistent oscillations and dampened oscillations. The last two examples show
experiments without robot traders for upper bounds of 100 and 1000 respectively.48
the upper bound for price predictions, set to 100 (as in the case with robot traders)
and 1000 respectively. Hommes et al. (2008) ran experiments without robot traders
and a high upper bound of 1000 (maintaining the same fundamental price pf = 60)
and in 6 out of their 7 markets long lasting price bubbles (almost) reaching the up-
per bound were observed, with price levels up to 15 times the fundamental value.
Comparing the experimental results in Figure 1.14 with the simulated bench-
marks in Figure 1.13 one observes that realized prices under naive expectations
resemble realized prices in the case with monotonic convergence remarkably well.
On the other hand, the case of persistent oscillatory behavior in the experiment
is qualitatively similar to the asset price behavior when participants use a simple
AR(2) prediction strategy. Clearly, naive and AR(2) prediction strategies give a
qualitatively much better description of aggregate asset price 
uctuations in the
experiment than does the benchmark case of rational expectations. Recall from
Subsection 1.5.3 that an AR(2) rule has a simple behavioral interpretation as an
anchor and adjustment trend following forecasting strategy.
1.5.5 Individual prediction strategies
In this subsection we discuss some characteristics and estimation of individual pre-
diction strategies. Some participants try to extrapolate observed trends and by
doing so overreact and predict too high or too low. Other participants are more
cautious when submitting predictions, using adaptive expectations, that is, an av-
erage of their last forecast and the last observed price. An individual degree of
overreaction can be quantied as the average absolute (one-period) change in pre-











The average absolute change in the price is given by 4 = 1
41
P51
t=11 jpt   pt 1j.
We will say that individual h overreacts if e
h > 4 and we will say that individual h
is cautious if 4e
h  4. Figure 1.15 illustrates the individual degree of overreaction
for the dierent groups. In the case of monotonic convergence (groups 2 and 5),
there is no overreaction; in the case of permanent oscillations (groups 1, 6, 8, 9)
a majority of subjects shows some overreaction, but it is relatively small. In the
case of dampened oscillations (groups 4, 7 and 10), with large temporary bubbles in
the initial phases of the experiment, a majority of participants strongly overreacts.
Oscillatory behavior and temporary bubbles are thus caused by overreaction of a
majority of agents.
Individual prediction strategies have been estimated using a simple linear model
pe
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Figure 1.15. Individual degrees of overreactions for 10 dierent groups, all with a robot trader,
the rst 7 with a fundamental p
f = 60 and the last 3 with a fundamental p
f = 40. The line
segments represent the average absolute price change, while the dots represent the average
absolute changes in individual forecasts. Dots above the line segments correspond to individual
overreaction.
where t is an IID noise term. This general setup includes several important special
cases: i) naive expectations (h1 = 1, all other coecients equal to 0); ii) adaptive
expectations (h1 + 
h0 = 1, all other coecients equal to 0) and iii) AR(L)
processes (all coecients equal to 0, except h, h1;:::;hL). The estimation
results for 60 participants (using observations t = 11 to t = 51) may be summarized
as follows:
1. For more than 90% of the individuals the simple linear rule (1.5.7) describes
forecasting behavior well;
2. In the monotonically converging markets, a majority of subjects uses a naive,
an adaptive or an AR(1) forecasting rule;
3. In the dampened and persistently oscillating markets a majority of subjects
uses simple AR(2) or AR(3) forecasting rules; in particular a number of
subjects use a simple trend following rule of the form
pe
h;t+1 = pt 1 + h (pt 1   pt 2); h > 0: (1.5.8)
This forecasting rule corresponds to positive feedback or momentum traders.
Within each group, participants learn to coordinate on a simple forecasting rule,
which becomes self-fullling. If participants coordinate on an adaptive or AR(1)
forecasting rule, the asset price monotonically converges to the fundamental price.
In contrast, if the participants coordinate on a trend following rule, transitory
or even permanent price oscillations may arise, with persistent deviations from
fundamental price. Anufriev and Hommes (2007) extended the adaptive belief
systems (ABS) in Section 1.1 and developed an evolutionary heuristics switching50
model matching all three dierent observed patterns in the learning to forecasting
experiments remarkably well.
1.5.6 Protability
In the learning to forecasting experiments subjects have been rewarded by their
forecasting performance. As discussed in Hommes (2001), the tness measure of
(minus) squared forecasting errors is equivalent to risk adjusted prots and therefore
it may be a relevant measure in real markets (cf. footnote 6). But it is interesting to
investigate the corresponding realized prots of the pension funds. In this section
we therefore brie
y discuss the protability, that is the (non-risk adjusted) realized
prots, of the investment strategies. Realized prots of a mean-variance investment
strategy based on a price forecast pe
h;t+1 are given by
ht = (pt+1 + yt+1   Rpt)(pe
h;t+1 +  y   Rpt): (1.5.9)
As a typical example, Figure 1.16 shows the realized prots and the realized accu-
mulated prots in group 4, that is, a group with robot trader and upperbound 100
exhibiting dampened price oscillations (the third panel in Figure 1.14). Figure 1.16
shows the realized prots corresponding to the six individual forecasts, the real-
ized prots of the fundamental robot trader, the realized prots of a hypothetical
switching strategy, together with the realized price series (scaled by a factor 3).
Clearly there are large 
uctuations in the realized prots and all strategies oc-
casionally suer from large losses. The fundamental strategy starts with positive
prots in periods 1 6, as the asset price rises from below the fundamental. When
the asset price rises above its fundamental value and the bubble starts, the funda-
mental strategy makes large losses in periods 7 13. At the peak of the rst bubble,
at period 13, the fundamental strategy has performed one but last on average, with
the one but lowest accumulated realized prots. During the crash however, the
fundamentalists make huge prots because they have built a large short position
in the risky asset. At the same time, most other (trend following) strategies suer
large losses, because they hold long positions. As the crash continues and the asset
price falls below its fundamental value, the fundamental strategy starts making
losses again. At the bottom of the market in period 19, fundamentalists make a
large loss. Over the full sample of 50 periods however, on average the fundamental
strategy performs very well and accumulates more prots than the other 6 forecast-
ing strategies. Figure 1.16 also shows that the fundamental strategy is beaten by
a switching strategy, always selecting the best (according to last period's realized
prot) out of the 7 other strategies. Stated dierently, the switching strategy al-
ways uses the forecast of the advisor whose pension fund generated highest realized
prot in the previous period. Such a switching strategy beats the fundamental






























































Figure 1.16. Realized (non-risk adjusted) prots (top panel) and accumulated prots (bottom
panel) for group 4 (see Fig. 1.14), with a robot trader and price upper bound 100. The left
panels show periods 1-50, while right panels zoom into periods 1-25; the realized price series
(scaled by a factor 3) is also shown. The top panel shows graphs of the realized prots
corresponding to the six individual forecasting strategies, the fundamental robot trader, and a
hypothetical switching strategy using the best (according to last period's realized prots) of
the other 7 strategies. The bottom panel shows the accumulated prots of these 8 strategies.
Realized prots exhibit large 
uctuations over time and all strategies at times suer from large
losses. On average and in terms of accumulated prots the fundamental strategy performs
very well, but is beaten by the switching strategy.52
1.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has reviewed some behavioral nance models with evolutionary selec-
tion of heterogeneous trading strategies and discussed their empirical and exper-
imental validity. When strategy selection is driven by short run realized prots,
trend following strategies may destabilize asset markets. Asset price 
uctuations
are characterized by phases where fundamentalists dominate and prices are close
to fundamentals, suddenly interrupted by possibly long lasting phases of price bub-
bles when trend following strategies dominate the market and prices deviate persis-
tently from fundamentals. Even in simple heterogeneous beliefs models, asset prices
are dicult to predict and market timing based on the prediction of the start or
the collapse of a bubble is extremely dicult and highly sensitive to noise. Esti-
mation of simple versions of heterogeneous agent models on yearly S&P500 data
suggests that stock prices are characterized by behavioral heterogeneity. Simple
evolutionary models therefore could provide an explanation of, for example, the
\dot com" bubble, as being triggered by good news about economic fundamentals,
and subsequently strongly amplied by trend following trading strategies. Labora-
tory experiments with human subjects conrm that coordination on simple trend
following strategies may arise in asset markets and cause persistent deviations from
fundamentals.
In a heterogeneous beliefs asset pricing model, as long as prices 
uctuate around
their fundamental value, fundamentalists strategies do quite well in terms of accu-
mulated prots. If there are no limits to arbitrage and fundamentalists can survive
possibly long lasting bubbles during which they suer large losses, their strategy
performs very well in the long run and may help stabilize markets. However, fun-
damentalists can be beaten by a switching strategy based on recent realized prots,
thus providing an incentive for investors to keep switching strategies. It should
be noted that the models discussed here are very stylized with a well dened fun-
damental price. In real markets, there may be a lot of disagreement about the
\correct" fundamental price and it may then be not so clear what the fundamen-
tal strategy would be. Limits to arbitrage may also prevent fundamentalists from
holding long lasting positions opposite to the trend, as more and more traders go
with the trend based on their recent success.
Most behavioral asset pricing models focus on a single risky asset. Only few
extensions to a multi-asset setting have been made until now. Westerho (2004)
and Chiarella et al. (2007) considered multi-asset markets, where chartists can
switch their investments between dierent markets for risky assets. The interaction
between the dierent markets causes complex asset price dynamics, with dierent
markets exhibiting co-movements as well as clustered volatility and fat tails of
asset returns. B ohm and Wenzelburger (2005) apply random dynamical systems
to investigate the performance of ecient portfolios in a multi-asset market with
heterogeneous investors.
Work on complex evolutionary systems in nance is rapidly growing, but littleCONCLUDING REMARKS 53
work has been done on policy implications so far. The most important dierence
with a representative rational agent framework is probably that in a heterogeneous
boundedly rational world, asset price 
uctuations exhibit excess volatility. If this is
indeed the case, it has important policy implications e.g. concerning the debates on
whether a Tobin tax on nancial transactions is desirable or whether nancial regu-
lation is desirable. Westerho and Dieci (2006) use a complex evolutionary system
to investigate the eectiveness of a Tobin tax. Investors can invest in two dierent
speculative asset markets. If a Tobin tax is imposed on one market, it is stabi-
lized while the other market is destabilized; if a tax is imposed on both markets,
price 
uctuations in both markets decrease. Brock, Hommes and Wagener (2008)
study the eects of nancial innovation upon price volatility and welfare. They
extend the asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs in Section 1.1 by intro-
ducing hedging instruments in the form of Arrow securities, that is, state contingent
claims to uncertain future events. They show that more hedging instruments may
destabilize markets and decrease welfare when agents are boundedly rational and
choose investment strategies based on reinforcement learning. The intuition of this
result is simple: optimistic and/or pessimistic traders take larger positions when
they can hedge more risk, and those who happen to be on the right side of the
market will be reinforced more. In a world of bounded rationality and learning
by past success, more hedging instruments may thus lead to more persistent de-
viations from market fundamentals. Developing a theory of complex multi-asset
market models with heterogeneous interacting trading strategies and its empirical
and experimental testing will be an important area of research for years to come.
From a practitioners viewpoint this kind of research seems highly relevant to gain
more insight into the causes of nancial crises, such as the recent credit crisis, in
order to hopefully avoid them in the future.APPENDIX ON BIFURCATION THEORY
The purpose of this appendix is to show how stability loss of a stable steady state
is necessarily connected to one of a small number of standard bifurcations. For
this, we sketch in the rst section how a system at stability loss can be reduced
to a one- or two-dimensional system. In the second section we present the most
common bifurcation scenarios, saddle-node, period-doubling, Hopf and pitchfork.
See Kuznetsov (1995) for a detailed mathematical treatment of bifurcation theory.
A.1 BASIC CONCEPTS FROM DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS.
Instead of directly dealing with evolution equations of the form
xt = '(xt 1; ;xt n); (A.1.1)
dynamical system theory usually considers rst order vector dynamics
yt = (yt 1); (A.1.2)















Given an initial state y0, the orbit of  through y0 is the sequence fytg1
t=0 satisfy-
ing A.1.2 for every t. For instance a steady state  x of the evolution equation, which
satises  x = '( x; ;  x), corresponds to the constant orbit yt = ( x; ;  x) for all t
of . Such an orbit is called a xed point of the dynamical system .
In this appendix we discuss only stability changes of xed points (but stability
changes of periodic points can be handled similarly). By denition, a xed point  y
is asymptotically stable if for all y0 suciently close to  y the orbit of  through y0
tends to  y as t ! 1. A xed point  y is unstable, if arbitrarily close to it there are
initial points y0 whose orbits do not tend to  y as t ! 1.
Let us assume, for simplicity, that y = 0 is a xed point of . The linearisation
of the dynamics A.1.2 at y = 0 is given as
yt = Lyt 1; (A.1.4)
where L = D(0) is the n  n Jacobi matrix of  at  y = 0. We have
Theorem A.1.1 If all eigenvalues j, j = 1; ;n, of L satisfy jjj < 1, then
the xed point y = 0 is asymptotically stable. If there is at least one eigenvalue
such that jjj > 1, then y = 0 is unstable.BASIC CONCEPTS FROM DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS. 55
In general, a xed point  y is called hyperbolic if no eigenvalue  of L is on the
complex unit circle, that is, jj 6= 1. Note that the stability of a hyperbolic xed
point can be determined just by looking at the eigenvalues.
A bifurcation of a system is a qualitative change in the orbit structure as a
system parameter is changed. In this appendix, we shall focus on the simplest kind
of bifurcations, the possibilities of a xed point to lose stability as a one-dimensional
parameter is varied.
That is, we consider the case that the system map  : Rn ! Rn depends on
a parameter  2 [1;2]. Let us assume that  y1 is an attracting hyperbolic xed
point of the map 1. Note that the xed point equation
(y)   y = 0 (A.1.5)
can be solved for y as a function of  whenever det(D(y)   I) 6= 0, that is,
whenever  = 1 is not an eigenvalue of D(y). Consequently, we can nd a
parametrised family of xed points  y such that  y1 =  y1, and we can investigate
the stability of  y as  varies.
The eigenvalues 1; ;n of L = D( y) are continuous functions of ; by
assumption jj(1)j < 1 for all j. Theorem A.1.1 implies that stability changes can
only occur if for some 0 2 (1;2) the xed point fails to be hyperbolic; that is,
if one of the eigenvalues, say 1(0), has absolute value one.
There are three main mechanisms how a xed point can fail to be hyperbolic: the
saddle-node bifurcation 1(0) = 1; the period-doubling bifurcation 1(0) =  1;
and the Hopf bifurcation 1(0) = ei with 0 <  < . In the last case, there are
two eigenvalues of absolute value equal to one, as the complex conjugate e i is
necessarily an eigenvalue as well. Of course, it could happen that several eigenvalues
have absolute value equal to one simultaneously in congurations other than those
listed above, but it can be shown that these cases are atypical for one-parameter
systems.29
We shall analyse these three bifurcations one by one below. The rst step in each
analysis is to simplify the system by restricting it to an invariant centre manifold.
Recall that a set W is invariant under  if (W) = W.
Theorem A.1.2 (Centre manifold theorem). Let y be a xed point of  that
is nonhyperbolic if  = 0. For  suciently close to 0, there is a family of
invariant manifolds Wc
, depending dierentiably on , such that Wc
0 is tangent to
the eigenspace associated to the nonhyperbolic eigenvalues at  = 0.
The complete complexity of a bifurcation is retained if the map  is resticted
to the centre manifold Wc
.
29These congurations are non-persistent: they can be removed by making an arbitrarily small
change to the system .56
A.2 BIFURCATION SCENARIOS
The saddle-node bifurcation
At this bifurcation, two xed points are created or disappear, depending on the
direction of the parameter change.
A saddle node bifurcation occurs in the case that 1(0) = 1 and a one-
dimensional associated eigenspace. After introducing suitable new variables, the
restriction of  to the associated one-dimensional centre manifold takes the form
(x) = x +    x2 + x3g(x;); (A.2.1)
where g is some dierentiable function. In fact, it is sucient to consider the normal
form
NF
 (x) = x +    x2; (A.2.2)
this has to be justied afterwards by arguing that the full family  has qualitatively
the same dynamics. This latter step is not hard but rather technical and will
therefore be omitted.
Let us analyse the normal form. Note that for  = 0, the system has a single
xed point x = 0 and L = DNF
0 (0) = 1, so we are indeed in the saddle-node case.
For general , xed points are the solutions of the equation x = NF
 (x); for   0
they are given as
 x1 =
p
;  x2 =  
p
; (A.2.3)
whereas for  < 0 no xed points exist.
The linearisations Lj = DNF( xj) = 1   2 xj read as
L1 = 1 + 2
p
; L2 = 1   2
p
: (A.2.4)
We conclude that  x1 is repelling and that  x2 is attracting.
All this information can be summarised in a bifurcation diagram; see gure A.17.
In the diagram, the location of the xed points is plotted as a function of the
parameter ; the branch of stable xed points is indicated by the solid curve,
whereas the dashed curve indicates the location of unstable xed points. At  = 0,
the two branches meet and there is exactly one xed point; for  < 0, there are no
xed points.
The period doubling bifurcation
In this bifurcation, an attracting xed point loses stability, and a period-two orbit
is generated.
A period doubling bifurcation occurs if 1(0) =  1. The eigenspace and the
corresponding centre manifold are again one-dimensional. The normal form reads
in this case as
NF







Figure A.17. Saddle-node and period-doubling/pitchfork bifurcation diagrams
with a = 1. We only consider the supercritical case a = 1, which occurs if the
xed point is globally attracting under  for  < 0. Note that  x = 0 is now a
xed point for all values of ; moreover,
L = DNF
 (0) =  1   : (A.2.6)
We conclude that  x is attracting for  2 <  < 0 and repelling for  > 0 or  <  2,
implying in particular that the xed point loses its stability at  = 0. Moreover,
note that
jNF(jxj)j = (1 +    jxj2)jxj = jxj (A.2.7)
if jxj =
p




g is invariant. As the points
in this sets are not xed points, necessarily one is mapped to the other by the
map NF.
The set P is a so-called periodic orbit, and its elements are period-2 points. In
general, a period-m point is a point which is mapped to itself after m iterations of
the system map. It can be veried that nearby orbits are attracted to the period 2
orbit P as t ! 1; the period 2 orbit P is asymptotically stable.
The Hopf bifurcation
In a Hopf (or Neimark-Sacker) bifurcation, a xed point loses stability and an
invariant circle is generated. The bifurcation occurs if 1(0) = ei and 2(0) =
e i,  2 (0;)nf
3; 
2; 2
3 g; the associated centre manifold is two-dimensional.
Again restricting to the supercritical case, the normal form can be expressed as











where #(x) =  + (x2
1 + x2
2). By introducing polar coordinates x1 = rcos ,
x2 = rsin , the map takes the form
NF(r; ) =

(1 + )r   r3
  +  + r2

(A.2.9)58
As in the case of the period-doubling bifurcation, the origin r = 0 is stable if  2 <
 < 0 and unstable if  > 0 (or  <  2). Moreover, for  > 0 there is a stable
invariant circle
C = f(r; ) : r =
p
g: (A.2.10)
That is, as the stable xed point r = 0 loses stability, a stable invariant circle
branches o. The dynamics on the circle are given as
  7!   +  +  mod 2 (A.2.11)
In the case of the Hopf bifurcation, investigating which properties of the normal




Figure A.18. Hopf bifurcation diagram
The pitchfork bifurcation
Above we have listed the three simplest typical bifurcations of general systems.
Sometimes a system has a special symmetry, like a re
ection symmetry: ( x) =
 (x). In the space of such systems, bifurcations that are nontypical for general
systems may become typical. An example is the pitchfork bifurcation, which is
typical for systems with re
ection symmetry.
The normal form for a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation reads as
(x) = (1 + )x   x3: (A.2.12)
Note that ( x) =  (x), and that as a consequence the point x = 0 is a xed
point for all , stable if  2 <  < 0, unstable otherwise. Moreover, for  > 0, the
points x = 
p
 are stable xed points, branching o the xed point x = 0 as that
point loses stability.
Note that the bifurcation diagram of the pitchfork bifurcation is identical to
that of the period doubling bifurcation, but that the interpretation of the branches
is dierent. In a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation one steady state changes
stability, while two new (stable) steady states are created.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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